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used: 
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be treated with caution. 
0=a true zero, no cases for this category. 
-=that this category is not applicable. 
Tests of significance are at the five per cent level. All results are significant at this 
level unless otherwise stated. 
Column or row percentages may sum to more than 100 due to rounding. 
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SUMMARY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This report examines the use of Social Fund loans by families with children. The 
research involved a review of the existing evidence on the Social Fund, together with 
secondary analysis of two large-scale datasets, the Families and Children Study 
(FACS) and the Family Resources Survey.  Although neither survey was designed to 
facilitate evaluation of the Social Fund, the wide range of questions about the 
characteristics and circumstances of respondents makes it possible to compare 
applicants with non-applicants for loans.  FACS does not distinguish between 
budgeting loans and crisis loans, but the great majority of Social Fund loan awards 
are for budgeting loans. 
 
 
Literature review 
 
There is a wealth of literature on the administration of the Social Fund, much of it 
focused on decision-making, the use of discretion and the implications of the annual 
budgeting.  By comparison, there has been much less research on Social Fund 
applicants.  Moreover, much of the research on applicants is now somewhat dated 
and was conducted prior to the April 1999 changes to the scheme.  There have been 
a number of important qualitative studies of claimant circumstances and experiences 
in recent years, but relatively few quantitative studies.  Moreover, most of the 
research has focused on claimants at one point in time rather than looking at them 
over a period of time. 
 
 
Applications to the Social Fund 
 
During 2002/03, there were 1.77 million applications and 1.25 million awards for 
budgeting loans. Excluding applicants who were not eligible for a budgeting loan, the 
application success rate was 83 per cent. In the financial year 2001/02, seven per 
cent of recipients of qualifying benefits had received a Social Fund budgeting loan in 
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the previous six months, two per cent had received a crisis loan and one per cent 
had received a community care grant.  One in six Income Support recipients were 
repaying a Social Fund loan, as were two per cent of respondents on income-based 
Jobseeker’s Allowance. 
 
Young adults and young middle-aged people, lone parents and sick or disabled 
people, made the most use of Social Fund loans.  Pensioners and benefit units 
headed by people of Asian or Asian British background were the least likely to use 
the Social Fund to borrow money.   
 
Each year from 2000 to 2002, four out of ten Income Support recipients applied to 
the Social Fund for a loan. Between one and two out of ten Income Support 
recipients apply to the Department for Work and Pensions each year for a Social 
Fund grant.  Between 2000 and 2002, one in four families on Income Support applied 
to the Social Fund in one year only, one in six had applied in two of the years, and 
one in ten had applied in all three years.  A considerable proportion of Income 
Support recipients were therefore repeat applicants to the Social Fund, though only a 
small minority were serial applicants applying every year. 
 
 
Which families make use of Social Fund loans? 
 
‘Social Fund customers’ in this report are defined as Income Support recipients who 
had applied for a loan from the Social Fund in the previous 12 months or currently 
had a deduction from their benefit to pay off a Social Fund loan.  Just under half of all 
Income Support recipients could be described as Social Fund customers.  The 
remainder had neither applied for a loan in the previous year nor were paying off a 
loan, and hence were not Social Fund customers at that time.   
 
A higher proportion of Social Fund customers compared with other Income Support 
recipients in 2002 were lone parents and a smaller proportion were couples with 
children.  Social Fund customers were generally younger than non-customers.  The 
age of the youngest child was younger among Social Fund customers than among 
other Income Support recipients in 2002.  Social Fund customers were much more 
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likely to be tenants than were other Income Support recipients in 2002.  Social Fund 
customers were as likely as non-customers to have a long-standing illness, health 
problem or disability and to have caring responsibilities.  The self-perceived health of 
customers and non-customers over the last 12 months was also similar. 
 
Excluding people who had been on Income Support for less than six months (and 
who were therefore not eligible for a loan), there was no relationship between length 
of time on benefit and being a Social Fund customer.   
 
Very few Income Support recipients tended to have money over at the end of the 
week or month, but Social Fund customers were more likely than other Income 
Support recipients to say that they never had money over.  The majority of Social 
Fund customers had experience of running out of money before the end of the week.  
Social Fund customers were more likely than other Income Support recipients to 
report that they always ran out of money before the end of the week.  Social Fund 
customers were less likely than other Income Support recipients to have a current or 
savings account in 2002 and much less likely to save regularly.  Among those who 
did have savings, Social Fund customers tended to have lower amounts than other 
Income Support recipients.   
 
Leaving aside their loan, Social Fund customers were more likely than other Income 
Support recipients to have debts. Social Fund customers were also more likely than 
other people on Income Support to have had trouble with debts that were hard to 
repay. Social Fund customers were significantly more likely to be experiencing 
hardship than other Income Support recipients.  
 
 
What Triggers a Social Fund loan application? 
 
Certain life events may be associated with or trigger an application to the Social 
Fund.  Such events may occur on their own or simultaneously with other events. It 
was found that, whether occurring simultaneously with other events or in isolation, 
three events were associated with Social Fund loan applications among families on 
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Income Support.  These were a child reaching three years of age, a child reaching 
school age (5 years), and moving house. 
 
It was also found that both couple parents and families with savings were to some 
extent protected from the negative affects of some of these life events.  For them, 
unlike lone parents and families with no savings, these events were less likely to be 
associated with applications to the Social Fund. 
 
 
Social Fund loans and hardship and deprivation 
 
On five out of nine hardship indicators, there was a significant relationship between 
repaying a Social Fund loan and hardship change in the following year.  These were 
worrying about money almost all the time and running out of money most weeks, 
having no bank account and two or more debts, being unable to afford to keep house 
warm, having a relative material deprivation score on clothing items in the highest 7.5 
per cent, and having a relative material deprivation score on consumer durables in 
the highest 7.5 per cent. For each of these indicators, those repaying a Social Fund 
loan were significantly more likely to experience change in hardship compared to 
those not repaying a Social Fund loan.  For some individual hardship indicators, the 
change involved a move into less hardship, but for others it involved moving into 
deprivation or was not decisively one way or the other. According to the combined or 
overall hardship measure, those repaying a loan were less likely to experience 
change in hardship compared to those not repaying a Social Fund loan.  But where 
those repaying a loan did experience change, it was more likely to be in the direction 
greater hardship. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1   Background 
 
The Social Fund was introduced in 1988 and replaced the previous system of single 
payments to meet special lump sum needs.  It provides grants and repayable loans 
to help certain people with the cost of one-off expenses that could not be routinely 
anticipated or easily budgeted for within regular benefit income (Smith, 1990; 
Kempson et al., 1994).   
 
There are two main components of the Social Fund: the regulated fund and the 
discretionary fund.  The former comprises Winter Fuel Payments, Cold Weather 
Payments, Sure Start Maternity Grants, and Funeral Payments.  The discretionary 
fund has three elements:  
• Community care grants, a non refundable payment to meet specific kinds of 
exceptional need; 
• Budgeting loans, an interest free and repayable loan intended to cover larger 
items of expenditure for which it may be difficult to budget on Income Support or 
income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA); and 
• Crisis loans, repayable loans intended to meet expenses in an emergency, 
including living expenses. 
 
This report is focused on the budgeting loan scheme, which one commentator has 
described as ‘the operational heart and soul of the social fund’ (Craig, 2001, para 
3.11).  It is certainly the largest component of the discretionary Social Fund in terms 
of gross expenditure.  In the financial year 2002/03, £462 million was awarded in 
budgeting loans, £85 million in crisis loans and £108 million in community care grants 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2003).  Thus budgeting loans accounted for 71 
per cent of gross expenditure on the discretionary Social Fund, excluding 
administrative costs.  
 
Budgeting loans may cover expensive items the cost of which claimants may find it 
difficult to afford out of their regular weekly benefit, such as furniture, household 
equipment, children’s clothing, rent in advance and expenses connected with taking 
up a job.  Budgeting loans enable recipients to spread the cost of purchase and 
reduce the possibility that they will suffer hardship or get into (more) debt than would 
otherwise be the case.  
 
In April 1999, important changes were made to simplify the budgeting loans scheme.  
The previous system had a complex and cumbersome application and decision-
making process, which was time consuming and expensive to administer.  It also 
involved intrusive questioning as applicants had to justify the need for the items 
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applied for.  The new system is less intrusive, simpler, more transparent, quicker to 
administer and fairer.  Decisions are based on the length of time applicants have 
been getting benefit (Income Support or income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance) and 
the size of their family (DSS, 2001a).  Recent qualitative research concluded that, on 
the whole, ‘the recent changes to the Budgeting Loan scheme have been a big 
improvement’ (Kempson, 2001a, para 5.1).  Most claimants felt that the application 
process was straightforward, but few of them understood how the decisions about 
the size of the loan award and the rate of repayment had been reached (Whyley et 
al., 2000). 
 
Budgeting loans can be awarded to people who have been receiving Income Support 
and income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance for at least 26 weeks without a break for 
more than 28 days.  People in low paid work, in receipt of other social security 
benefits or who moved off benefit from more than a month at a time do not meet the 
qualifying criteria.  In addition, while budgeting loans are no longer based on specific 
items or services, applicants must still qualify under broad categories of need.  
Budgeting loans are subject to a minimum and a maximum limit.  The minimum loan 
is £30 and the maximum is £1,000.  Since the changes in 1999 there are also 
individual maximum limits linked to individual circumstances.  Any award is reduced if 
the applicant has capital over £500 (£1,000 if aged 60 or over).   
 
Budgeting loans are interest free, but have to be paid back.  Repayments for 
budgeting loans are normally deducted from people’s benefit entitlement, making it 
impossible for them to fall behind with repayments.  Repayments are flexible, take 
into account income and commitments, and are usually made over a period not 
exceeding 78 weeks.  The rate of repayment varies from five to 15 per cent of the 
total Income Support or income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance in payment to the 
family.  The standard loan repayment rate for an applicant with no direct deductions 
from their benefit, debts or other financial commitments is 15 per cent (DSS, 2001a).  
There are no financial penalties for late payment and loans can be rescheduled in the 
event of financial difficulty.  Research has found that loan recipients have very 
positive views about repayment by deduction from their benefit (Whyley et al., 2000). 
 
Research also shows that the Social Fund budgeting loan scheme is highly valued by 
users and provides an important source of finance for some of the most financially 
vulnerable people (Kempson, 2001a).  However, it has also proved to be somewhat 
controversial.  As discussed in the literature review, the Social Fund has been 
criticised because the annual budget is cash-limited (Craig, 2001).  One potential 
consequence of cash-limiting the budget is that ‘some people who are turned down 
for loans would have been successful if they had applied at a different time of the 
year’ (Kempson, 2001b, para 1).   
 
The fact that loans are paid at the discretion of the Department for Work and 
Pensions and not an automatic entitlement has also been criticised and led to 
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concerns about inconsistent decision-making (Rowe, 2002).  An evaluation of the 
discretionary Social Fund conducted shortly after the scheme was introduced found 
that the circumstances of people receiving awards of grants or loans were little 
different from those who were refused them or who did not apply (Huby and Dix, 
1992).  If those who are awarded help from the Social Fund are in genuine need but 
are largely indistinguishable from those who are refused or do not apply, ‘then it 
follows that the Social Fund is failing to reach many other people in similar need’ 
Huby and Whyley, 1996, p2).  However, that research was conducted before the 
1999 reform of the budgeting loan scheme.  The latter should have reduced the 
scope for inconsistent treatment between applicants (DSS, 2001) but not necessarily 
the problem of non-take up of the scheme by those in genuine need of help with 
budgeting for one-off expenses while on a low income. 
 
Those who do not borrow from the Social Fund may have to go without the item they 
need and face ‘inconvenience at best and hardship at worst’.  Alternatively, they may 
have to borrow from other sources, most of which are more expensive than 
budgeting loans (Kempson, 2001a, para 3.3).  Repaying expensive loans will reduce 
the amount of money they have available for their day-to-day living costs, though the 
same is true to a much lesser extent of the repayment of budgeting loans.  The 
operation of the budgeting loan scheme and in particular the extent to which it helps 
those in most need has important implications for the Government’s attempts to 
tackle financial exclusion and for its anti-poverty agenda.  
 
Although the Social Fund alone cannot lift people out of poverty (DWP, 2001b), it 
does have implications for poverty.  Research conducted by the Child Poverty Action 
Group indicated that many families on Income Support lacked ‘lumpy’ items such as 
weatherproof coats or all weather shoes for their children because they could not 
afford them (Howard, 2003).  This raises the question of whether the scheme is 
helping those most in need.  Meanwhile, other research has found that a substantial 
minority of families with children receiving qualifying benefits had applied to the 
Social Fund for a budgeting loan in 1999 (Marsh et al., 2001).  This indicates that 
such loans are playing a significant role in helping families to manage their budgets 
while in receipt of qualifying social security benefits.  But it also raises the question of 
why some people in receipt of qualifying benefits make use of the Social Fund and 
others do not and what impact borrowing or not borrowing money from the Fund has 
on hardship. 
 
1.2 Aims, data and methods 
 
The aim of the research is to examine the use of Social Fund loans by families with 
children in receipt of qualifying benefits. 
 
In particular, the research aims to examine the characteristics and circumstances of 
families (a) that have applied to the Social Fund for a loan or are currently repaying a 
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loan with (b) those who have neither applied for a loan nor are paying one off.  This 
should contribute to an understanding of whether the Social Fund is used by families 
in the most financial need.  The research also aimed to examine the events that are 
associated with or trigger applications to the Social Fund and the impact of loans on 
hardship. 
 
The research method is secondary analysis of two large-scale datasets, the Families 
and Children Study (FACS) and the Family Resources Survey.  Both surveys include 
a few questions about applications for and receipt of Social Fund loans and grants.  
Although neither survey was designed to facilitate evaluation of the Social Fund, the 
wide range of questions about the characteristics and circumstances of respondents 
makes it possible to compare recipients with non-recipients of loans.  The statistical 
analysis reported here provides a valuable complement to more qualitative studies of 
the use of the Social Fund (e.g. Whyley et al., 2000; Kempson et al., 2002). 
 
The analysis in this report is mainly based on the Families and Children Study 
(FACS).  The FACS survey is a large-scale, annual survey that commenced in 1999.  
It is basically a panel study - involving interviews with the same families from year to 
year - with booster samples added to each wave to ensure that the sample as a 
whole remains representative of the wider population from which it is drawn.  In the 
first two years, the study interviewed lone parents and low-to-moderate income 
couples with dependent children.  Since 2001, the study has interviewed a 
representative sample of all couple families as well as lone parents.  Almost 2,700 
families have been interviewed in all four years from 1999 to 2002, but the total 
number of families interviewed over this period was over 10,000.  Because some 
important changes were made to budgeting loans in April 1999, it was decided to 
focus the analysis on the survey data for 2000, 2001 and 2002.   
 
FACS can be analysed in two main ways.  First of all, it can be analysed cross-
sectionally, as a snapshot of families in each wave.  In the first two waves the 
snapshot is of lone parent and low/moderate income couple families.  In subsequent 
waves the snapshot is of a representative sample of all families.  Secondly, FACS 
can be analysed longitudinally by looking at how a panel of lone parent and 
low/moderate income families change from one wave of the study to next (Kasparova 
et al., 2003).  This research undertakes both cross-sectional analysis and panel 
analysis using the FACS data. 
 
One limitation of FACS is that it does not distinguish between budgeting loans and 
crisis loans.  Hence, except where specified to the contrary, references to Social 
Fund loans in this report should be taken to mean both budgeting and crisis loans 
collectively.  However, the great majority of Social Fund loan awards are for 
budgeting loans. 
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Additional analysis was also undertaken with the Family Resources Survey.  The aim 
of this part of the study was to examine the importance of Social Fund loans for 
families with children compared with other client groups in receipt of the qualifying 
benefits of Income Support and income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance.  
 
1.3 This report 
 
Chapter 2 of the report comprises a review of the literature on the discretionary 
Social Fund.  This is not confined to the budgeting loan scheme or just to families, 
but also covers community care grants and crisis loans, as well as other types of 
client group. 
 
Chapter 3 examines how much use is made of the budgeting loan scheme.  It 
presents administrative statistics showing details of the number of applications and 
awards by different client groups, expenditure, and reasons for loan refusals.  It also 
draws on the Family Resources Survey to examine the extent to which different client 
groups rely on Social Fund loans to make ends meet.  And, finally, it draws on FACS 
for 2000 to 2002 to examine use of the Social Fund by families with children over 
time, including whether they make one-off or repeated applications for loans. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on families with children.  It examines the characteristics and 
circumstances of Social Fund loan customers and compares them with non-
customers in 2002.  It also uses data for 2000 to 2002 to compare one-off applicants 
with repeat applicants over this time period. 
 
Chapter 5 examines the life transitions that are associated with applications for a 
Social Fund loan among families with children.  The aim is to identify key events that 
are related to (‘trigger’) loan applications. 
 
Chapter 6 makes use of the longitudinal component of FACS to examine the 
relationship between receipt of a Social Fund loan and financial hardship or material 
deprivation. 
 
Chapter 7 summarises the main findings and conclusions of the study. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The Social Fund constitutes only a very small proportion of social security spending, 
but it has attracted considerable attention.  Debates have focused on the extent to 
which it has successfully provided help for those in need.  This literature review is 
confined to the discretionary fund and all references to the Social Fund refer to that 
component of the scheme, unless otherwise stated.  In this review we shall look at 
both applicants and non-applicants to the Social Fund.  First, we review the decision 
making process, which has important implications for who applies to the Social Fund.  
Then we explore who applies to the Social Fund; their reasons for applying; the 
outcome of applications; who is awarded grants and loans; experiences of repaying a 
budgeting loan and how unsuccessful applicants manage.  Our research aims to 
investigate these issues specifically in relation to budgeting loans, but we review the 
literature on grants as well.  This is partly to examine whether those applying for, and 
being awarded, loans are different from those being awarded a grant, but also 
because much of the literature on claimants is concerned with both loans and grants.  
 
The introduction of the Social Fund was followed by a flurry of studies into the 
scheme in the early 1990s.  By comparison, relatively few studies have been 
completed in recent years and especially since the April 1999 changes to budgeting 
loans.  This literature review will therefore focus on studies both before and after the 
1999 changes were made.  But it is important to note that the findings of earlier 
research might not actually reflect what is happening in the post-1999 Social Fund.  
Table A.1 in Appendix 1 summarises the objectives and methodology of the key 
studies and divides them up into those undertaken pre 1999 changes and post 1999. 
 
2.2 The decision making process 
 
The decision making process has important implications for who applies to the Social 
Fund and the outcomes of these applications.  We shall review this first. 
 
The three main ways that the Social Fund decision-making process affects who 
applies and who is awarded the Social Fund are: 
• direction 
• discretion  
• budgeting and cash-limits. 
 
We shall discuss each of these in turn. 
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2.2.1 Direction 
 
All Social Fund decisions are subject to formal directions from the Secretary of State.  
These directions influence who may or may not be considered for a grant or a loan. 
Since 1999, budgeting loan decision-making is based on legally binding, factual 
criteria such as the length of time on benefit and family size.  A higher ‘weighting’ is 
given to those who have been on benefit for longer periods and to larger families 
(Howard, 2003).  However, whilst not formally discretionary, it has been suggested 
that some of the directions, especially for community care grants and pre-1999 
budgeting loans, could be interpreted differently by different Social Fund decision 
makers (Dalley and Berthoud, 1992).  For example, community care grants are 
payable to people who remain or establish themselves in the community.  They can 
only be paid to people who fall within one of the recognised circumstances (for 
example, to help people remain in the community rather than enter residential care; 
to ease ‘exceptional’ pressures on the family).  A judgment has therefore got to be 
made about the likelihood of care or the degree of pressure on a person and their 
family.  In this sense, the Social Fund officers are required to make judgements 
about the nature of need, which in practice are indistinguishable from discretion 
(Dalley and Berthoud, 1992). 
 
When budgeting loans were first introduced in 1988, there were rules limiting the 
receipt of additional loans (Cohen et al., 1996).  Currently, the amount offered 
depends on the amount of any outstanding loan: double the amount the applicant 
already owes to the Social Fund is deducted from the maximum that can be loaned.  
Loans can be refused where double debt exceeds the maximum amount that can be 
loaned, or where outstanding debt is at or above the £1,000 limit (Howard, 2003).  
The loan can also be refused if it is considered that the applicant cannot afford to 
repay it.  In addition, no loan may be awarded in excess of the amount that the 
applicant is likely to be able to repay.  It has been suggested that this not only relies 
on judgement but also means that the poorest may not be given help. 
 
Pre-1999 research found that in many cases, officers failed an application by 
discussing exceptional pressure for grants or items for budgeting loans in terms of 
what the budget could afford, or because of ‘low priority’, despite the fact that these 
should be irrelevant at the stage of direction (Dalley and Berthoud, 1992; Huby and 
Dix, 1992). 
 
2.2.2 Discretion 
 
When the Social Fund was first introduced in 1988, one of its most controversial 
elements was the use of discretion to determine need by assigning priority to each 
application.  Initially, a framework for this was provided on a national scale by 
‘guidance’ in the Social Fund manual.  At local level, each office had its own priority 
list, formulated in light of local circumstances.  The guidance on community care 
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grants emphasised considerations of the type of person making the application, or 
the situation s/he is in (elderly, disabled, families under distress etc.)  
 
Prior to 1999, applications for budgeting loans could only be made for certain items 
and the guidance on budgeting loans focused more on the items requested: furniture, 
bedclothes, home repairs, etc.  But the Social Fund officers were also expected to 
make a judgment of each application on its own merits (Dalley and Berthoud, 1992).  
This meant that two officers could accept or decline the same application for very 
different reasons (Huby and Dix, 1992) or that two people needing almost identical 
items might be in contrasting circumstances and the Social Fund officer could decide 
to give a loan to one and not the other (Dalley and Berthoud, 1992).  There is 
evidence that, ultimately, budgeting pressure predominated, influencing the kinds of 
people, or the range of items in specific circumstances that loans were awarded 
(Dalley and Berthoud, 1992).  Since 1999, a set of broad categories based on need 
for financial assistance for intermittent expense has been introduced rather than a 
demonstrated need for specific items. 
 
2.2.3 Budgeting and cash-limits 
 
The budgeting of the Social Fund is important because it can affect who is and is not 
awarded money from the Fund.  It has been suggested that the very nature of the 
Social Fund leads to geographical variation and what has been termed as a postcode 
and a calendar lottery (Howard, 2003).  Each local office has an annual budget for 
grants and a separate one for loans.  This used to be allocated partly according to 
local need, including the proportion of unemployed and pensioners in the local office 
caseload.  However, it has been suggested that budget allocation was influenced as 
much by administrative factors as by indicators of need (Huby and walker, 1991).  
Whether any method of allocation could accurately reflect local needs has also been 
questioned (Cohen et al., 1996).  In the past, local budgets and local discretion led to 
alleged inconsistency and unfairness in Social Fund decisions.  
 
When making a decision, the Social Fund officer had to take account of the total 
outstanding budget.  Each officer had an estimate of the amount to be spent if the 
target was to be achieved - known as the ‘profile’.  If spending overran the profile, the 
priority grading qualifying for payments was restricted to reduce the rate of awards 
and if spending was below target, lower priority applications were allowed in order to 
increase the rate of payment (Dalley and Berthoud, 1992).  Local managers could 
adjust the levels of priority they were able to meet throughout the year to reflect the 
state of the budget and thus the capacity to meet needs (Rowe, 2002).  
 
Research undertaken in the early 1990s found that Social Fund officers’ decisions 
were affected by the size of the local budget (Huby and Dix, 1992).  Often, officers 
only met those needs designated ‘high priority’ but in practice, what was designated 
high priority was continuously redefined in line with changes in the budget (Huby and 
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Walker, 1991).  In an analysis of the first thirteen years of the Social Fund (1988-
2001), it has been claimed that the concern by managers that they might overspend 
their budget early on in the year, and a desire to spend up to their prescribed limit in 
order to avoid loss of budget in subsequent years, have meant that February and 
March are better months in which to put in an application (Craig, 2003).  Earlier 
research has shown that in some offices, applicants have been more successful at 
the end of the financial year when it was known how much money was left in the 
local office budget.  But other offices have had to cut back at the end of the year due 
to low available funds (Huby and Walker, 1991).  Consequently, budgetary 
constraints have potentially affected who is getting what and where they get it 
(Cohen et al., 1996). 
  
However, recent changes have been made to the discretionary Social Fund to make 
it more consistent and fair.  Under the current system, both loan and grant budgets 
are allocated according to forecast demand.  In addition, for budgeting loans, local 
budgets are now adjusted throughout the year by redistributing budgets between 
Jobcentre Plus Districts.  In addition, changes in August 2002 have meant that all 
local Social Fund decision makers are now formally advised to apply the same 
national baseline budgeting loan award amount when determining applications 
(DWP, 2003).  All these changes are intended to increase consistency of outcome for 
applicants, irrespective of where they live or the time of year applied.  Amendments 
were also made to certain Discretionary Social Fund directions and guidance in 
August 2002.  They focused mainly on the consistency of decision-making.  Decision 
makers are now provided with extra information to help them understand better the 
overall budget position (DWP, 2003) and they do not have to apply discretion on 
prioritisation.   
 
2.3 Who applies to the Social Fund? 
 
Huby and Whyley (1996) compared applicants and non-applicants to the Social 
Fund.  The research involved secondary analysis of the Social Fund survey 
conducted by Huby and Dix (1992).  It was found that, in a sample of 518 Income 
Support claimants with no Social Fund applications at the time of sampling, 60 per 
cent identified particular needs that they were unable to meet due to their financial 
commitments.  Whilst 41 per cent of these people applied to the fund during the six 
months before the end of the survey period, 59 per cent did not.  Meanwhile, Huby 
and Dix (1992) found that the circumstances of people receiving awards from the 
discretionary Social Fund were largely indistinguishable from those of others who did 
not apply to the fund.  This research was carried out a decade ago and it is unclear 
whether these findings remain true under the post-1999 rules. 
 
Huby and Dix (1992) also found that the group of eligible non-applicants was 
relatively small.  As a group, eligible non-applicants were older and had fewer 
children than eligible applicants.  Lone parents and couples with children formed a 
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disproportionately high percentage of Social Fund applicants compared with the 
distribution of Income Support recipients as a whole.  The percentage of pensioner 
applicants was disproportionately low.  
 
There are several major features of the Social Fund that may deter older applicants 
from applying.  First, research has shown that many older people are resistant to 
taking out loans, wanting to retain their independence, and assume that only loans 
are on offer (Cohen et al., 1996; Kempson et al., 2002).  Huby and Dix’s (1992) 
research found that pensioners were more likely than any other group to only apply 
for a community care grant and less likely to only apply for a budgeting loan.  When 
they do apply for a community care grant, they do so on the grounds that a payment 
would enable them to stay in the community rather than an institution.  Second, Age 
Concern England found that some older people may resist giving the personal 
information needed to back up an application, especially under a discretionary 
system - and therefore may not apply because there is no clear entitlement (Cohen 
et al., 1996).  More recent, post-1999 research found that older people were less 
willing to deal with officialdom or fill in the application form and were put off by the 
stigma of applying.  It was also found that older people were deterred by the high rate 
of repayment of budgeting loans, and this was especially the case among couples 
who were worried they would leave their partners with an unmanageable debt 
(Kempson et al., 2002).  
 
The Social Fund may be the only source of help for people with low incomes who 
cannot gain access to commercial credit (Whyley et al., 2000).  Moreover, budgeting 
loans are interest free and repayments are deducted from benefits.  Some claimants 
prefer this method of repayment as it helps to ensure that they do not fall behind with 
payments (Whyley et al., 2000).  There is some evidence that applicants to the Social 
Fund do differ from non-applicants in respect of income, debt and the way they 
manage money.  Recent research by Howard (2003) used data from the Families 
and Children Study (FACS) to demonstrate that people in debt were more likely to 
have applied for a loan from the Social Fund.  Almost half those who had moved into 
debt from one year to the next or were already in debt (and were claiming Income 
Support) had applied for a Social Fund loan.  Around 20 per cent of children were 
living in families claiming Income Support that had applied for a Social Fund grant 
and were also either in debt in both years studied or had moved into debt. 
 
Huby and Dix (1992) found that pensioners were the least likely to apply to the 
discretionary Social Fund, but if they did they tended to have higher income on 
average than those of other groups.  Three-quarters of the applicants managed to 
save only rarely and often run out of money, although pensioners were most likely to 
have put money aside and the least likely to run out of money - a reflection, at least 
in part, of their higher incomes.  Eligible non-applicants are less likely to need money 
for one-off expenses and on average need smaller amounts of money, they had 
higher equivalent incomes and were more often able to put some money aside each 
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week (Huby and Dix, 1992).  More recent, qualitative research focusing on older 
applicants (Kempson et al., 2002) suggests that, among recipients of the Minimum 
Income Guarantee, applicants and non-applicants to the discretionary Social Fund 
had very similar living standards, approaches to and levels of savings, and levels of 
need for essential items.  However, applicants tended to say they cut back more 
often than non-applicants, and non-applicants tended to save up for items they 
needed rather than apply to the Social Fund (Kempson et al., 2002).  
 
The perceived small chance of receiving an award for required items could act as a 
deterrent to applying to the Social Fund.  Huby and Dix (1992) found that the kinds of 
items identified as being needed by non applicants were items that the discretionary 
Social Fund was less likely to award money for.  For example, only four per cent of 
cases were awarded money for items of clothing, but a third of those who had not 
applied to the Social Fund reported that they were in need of clothing.  This suggests 
that people did not apply to the Social Fund because they thought (or were advised) 
that they were unlikely to receive an award for the item needed.  Huby and Whyley 
(1996) have argued that it is very difficult for potential applicants to weigh up their 
chances of success because of the discretionary nature of the Social Fund.  This 
problem should have eased following the changes to budgeting loans in April 1999, 
though there is nonetheless evidence that applicants have relatively little knowledge 
of how the fund works (Kempson, 2001). 
 
Research has demonstrated that other reasons identified for non-applications are 
similar to those used to explain non take-up of other benefits, such as lack of 
knowledge of the fund (Stewart and Stewart, 1991; Dalley and Berthoud, 1992; 
Cohen et al., 1992); lack of understanding of the fund and the claiming process 
(Huby and Dix, 1992); or stigma and humiliation associated with the application 
process (Huby and Dix, 1992; Smith, 2003).  Studies have also suggested that who 
actually applies for a Social Fund loan rather than a grant depends on local publicity, 
on differences in the attitudes of social workers and advice agencies towards it, and 
on differences in the availability of alternative sources of help (Huby and Walker, 
1991; Smith, 2003).  Research undertaken prior to the April 1999 changes 
demonstrated that the long and complex application form often acted as a deterrent 
to applying for a budgeting loan (Evason et al., 1989; Smith 1990).  But the April 
1999 changes attempted to redress some of the problems with the earlier forms and 
there is now evidence that for some people the new application form acts as an 
incentive to use the scheme (Whyley et al., 2000). 
 
2.4 Reasons for applying to the Social Fund   
 
Huby and Dix’s (1992) survey found that, in 1990, people applied to the Social Fund 
for money for an average of 1.8 items.  Table 2.1 shows the ten items most applied 
for and the percentage of each family type requesting them.  The research showed 
that applicants with children were the most likely to apply for money for beds or 
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bedding and carpets.  Lone parents were also most likely to apply for money for 
furniture and a washing machine or drier.  Couples with children were the most likely 
to apply for money to buy food.  
 
Table 2.1  The ten items most frequently requested 
Column percentages 
 Pensioners 
 
Lone 
parents 
Couples with 
children 
Working age 
without children 
Total 
 
Bed, cot or mattress 
Carpets 
Bedding 
Furniture 
Cooker 
Clothing, shoes 
Decorating materials 
Washing machine/drier 
Curtains, linen 
Food 
 
11.3 
19.3 
10.9 
8.0 
16.0 
6.5 
13.4 
9.8 
6.9 
0.0 
29.7 
22.6 
22.8 
18.9 
12.8 
9.5 
4.6 
11.9 
5.5 
2.2 
25.8 
24.6 
20.6 
13.3 
14.0 
7.8 
12.8 
6.2 
5.7 
7.9 
17.9 
16.9 
19.0 
12.6 
12.7 
22.8 
11.0 
3.4 
4.4 
5.5 
23.8 
21.1 
20.3 
14.6 
13.3 
13.2 
9.5 
7.3 
5.2 
4.9 
(Number of cases) (121) (207) (175) (211) (714) 
Source: Huby and Dix (1992). 
 
Huby and Dix’s (1992) in-depth interviews and Cohen et al.’s (1996) case study 
found that Social Fund applications for money to buy beds, carpets, cookers and 
furniture were usually the result of a change in circumstances such as setting up 
home for the first time; moving home; or relationship breakdown.  Huby and Dix 
(1992) found that others applied for money to buy beds because their child had 
grown out of their cot or bed.  They also found that money to buy carpets was often 
required because children in the family had grown to toddler age or moved to a new 
room without carpets.  Money for furniture was needed to avoid discomfort caused by 
ill health or for those moving from institutional care.  Others asked for furniture to 
maintain existing homes in a pleasant and comfortable condition, and furniture and 
cookers were applied for in order to replace broken or second-hand items.  The 
research also found that items for decorating were usually applied for when people 
had just moved home; to make their home cleaner or brighter or for their sense of 
well-being.  Applications for clothing, at least among pensioners and families with 
children, were usually prompted by a need associated with ill health or disability.  
Money to buy food was applied for when budgets were disrupted by unforeseen 
circumstances - such as repaying bills, losing money or not receiving a giro (Huby 
and Dix, 1992).  
 
Qualitative research since the 1999 changes has demonstrated that most 
applications have been for the essential household items like carpets, beds, cookers, 
and washing machines (Buck, 2000; Kempson et al., 2002).  Kempson et al. (2002) 
found that budgeting loans and community care grants had been used by older 
applicants for a similar range of items, and offered two explanations for this.  First, 
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there is some overlap in the items people can apply for.  Second, due to poor 
knowledge, people had applied for a loan when they could have applied for a grant.  
 
Whyley et al.’s (2000) in depth, qualitative interviews with 16 budgeting loan 
applicants and 21 credit union members examined what items applicants for 
budgeting loans asked for compared to those using credit union loans.  Generally, 
budgeting loans were used for necessities and credit union loans for discretionary 
items and treats.  Even those applying for a budgeting loan to decorate their home 
generally only wanted to make their homes habitable by buying floor coverings, basic 
furniture and, occasionally, curtains.  However, there was some overlap between the 
items applied for between the two schemes.  This can be seen from Table 2.2, which 
gives the items applied for by those who used both schemes.  
 
Table 2.2 Items applied for by those who used both Budgeting Loans and credit 
union loans  
Use of budgeting loans Use of credit union loans 
Beds and bedding Christmas 
Oven Holidays and spending money 
Fridge Trips/visits to family 
Washing machine Clothes 
Floor coverings Carpets 
Furniture Furniture 
Household goods e.g. cutlery, crockery Paying bills 
Baby clothes/equipment Baby clothes, equipment 
 Redecorating 
 Christening, Holy Communion 
Source: Whyley et al. (2000) 
 
2.5 The outcome of applications  
 
The main source of help from the Social Fund is in the form of loans (Evans, 1994).  
Thus in 2002/03, gross spending on community care grants was £108 million 
compared to £546.4 million on loans, of which £461.8 million was on budgeting loans 
(DWP, 2003).  It appears that applications for community care grants are less likely 
to be successful than applications for budgeting loans.  The refusal rate of 
community care grants rose from 48 per cent in its first year to 81 per cent in 
1998/99.  But the refusal rate for budgeting loans has dropped from 41 per cent to 34 
per cent (Craig, 2003).  Refusal rates for both community care grants and budgeting 
loans have fallen since the 1999 changes.  Refusal rates from 2002/03 were 58.3 per 
cent for community care grants and 26.3 per cent for budgeting loans (DWP, 2003). 
 
Official data has shown that the reason for refusals was usually on the grounds of 
low priority in relation to the budget; not because their needs were not covered by the 
Fund, but because there was insufficient money in the Fund to meet those needs 
(Cohen et al., 1996; Craig, 2003).  It has been argued that because the Social Fund 
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is constrained by its fixed budget, if the take-up in terms of applications increases, 
then the proportion of applications refused will increase on the grounds of insufficient 
priority (Dalley and Berthoud, 1992). 
 
2.6 Who is awarded grants and loans? 
 
The only comprehensive analysis of who is actually awarded help from the Social 
Fund is the study by Huby and Dix (1992).  Table 2.3 shows the Social Fund 
application outcomes by family type from this study.  Couples with children were the 
most likely to have their application accepted for an award, but they were more likely 
to be awarded a loan than a grant.  Pensioners, on the other hand, were far more 
likely to be awarded a grant.  However, this study is now very dated and it remains 
unclear to what extent this picture holds true under the post-April 1999 scheme. 
 
Table 2.3 Social Fund application outcomes by family type 
Column percentages 
 Pensioners 
 
 
Lone 
parents 
 
Couples 
with 
children 
 
Working 
age without 
children 
Total 
 
 
Awarded a community care grant 
Awarded a loan 
Awarded both a grant and a loan 
Loan offered but not accepted 
Application refused 
Application refused but award 
made on review 
Applicant uncertain of outcome 
24.4 
27.9 
0.6 
4.1 
36.2 
5.2 
 
1.7 
16.9 
44.3 
0.0 
1.5 
32.5 
2.8 
 
2.1 
12.4 
47.8 
1.1 
4.0 
29.9 
3.9 
 
1.2 
13.2 
38.0 
0.8 
1.3 
45.1 
0.5 
 
1.1 
14.9 
42.6 
0.6 
2.3 
35.9 
2.5 
 
1.5 
(Number of cases) (148) (233) (188) (226) (795) 
Source: Huby and Dix (1992). 
 
Official expenditure figures provide more up to date information on who is receiving a 
grant or a loan (see Table 2.4).  The proportion of grants expenditure going to 
pensioners and the disabled has risen since the fund began in 1988, from 31 to 46 
per cent in 2002/03, whilst the proportion going to lone parents and the unemployed 
has dropped from 59 per cent to 43 per cent in 2002/03 (Craig, 2003; DWP, 2003).  
The latter groups are more heavily directed towards loans.  Over twice as many lone 
parents as other claimants (nearly half compared to one in five) have deductions 
made from their benefit for a Social Fund Loan (Gill, 2001).  
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Table 2.4 Expenditure by applicant group 
 Community Care Grants Budgeting Loans Crisis Loans 
 £m % £m % £m % 
Applicant group       
 Pensioners 10.0 9.3 21.8 4.7 1.2 1.4 
 Unemployed 11.6 10.8 37.8 8.2 29.4 34.7 
 Disabled 39.1 36.2 130.3 28.2 17.2 20.3 
 Lone Parents 35.0 32.4 231.1 50.0 19.8 23.5 
 Others 12.3 11.4 40.8 8.8 17.0 20.1 
Source: DWP (2003). 
 
As noted above, family size is taken into account when making a decision and a 
higher ‘weighting’ is given to larger families.  Official data demonstrates that the size 
of family is linked to the average award received - a couple with three or more 
children receives, on average, £231 more than a single person without children 
(DWP, 2003).  This gap increased by £14 between 2001/2 and 2002/3, rising from 
£217 to £231 (DWP, 2002).  
 
Table 2.5 Budgeting loans awards by family size 
Average Award £ Family size 
2001/2 2002/3 
Single Person 281 272 
Single Person with one child 383 368 
Single person with two children 426 414 
Single person with three or more children 465 464 
Couple 366 357 
Couple with one child 438 429 
Couple with two children 476 474 
Couple with three or more children 499 503 
Source: DWP (2002); DWP (2003) 
 
Analysis by family type does not in itself indicate whether grants and loans were 
actually going to those most in need.  The Social Fund application and budgeting 
process has led some researchers to question the extent to which the Social Fund 
actually provides for those in need.  Huby and Dix (1992) concluded that it could not 
be demonstrated that those who received payments were in greater need than those 
who were refused - payments were not targeted on those with greatest need.  For 
example, owner occupiers with higher equivalent incomes who had been in touch 
with advice centres were more likely to be awarded grants, whereas non-owner 
occupiers with lower equivalent income and living in more crowded accommodation 
were more likely to get loans.  
However, more recent qualitative research has found that more needy applicants are 
being awarded budgeting loans.  For example, Whyley et al. (2000) found that people 
who used the budgeting loan scheme were a distinct group compared to those who 
used credit unions.  They found that users of budgeting loans suffered from a high 
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degree of disadvantage and vulnerability, and were far more likely to be living in 
circumstances that tended to be associated with hardship; the majority being affected 
by ill-health or disability which restricted them from taking up paid employment; many 
experiencing family breakdown and several living in unstable circumstances.  Users 
of budgeting loans were also younger, perhaps because they had greater difficulty in 
managing money (as demonstrated in Whyley et al., 1997), and a high proportion 
comprised lone parents. 
 
A possible reason for the discrepancy between the two studies is because Whyley et 
al.’s (2000) study was undertaken after the 1999 changes, which perhaps suggests 
the changes have moved the Social Fund closer towards helping those most in need.  
But the evidence is inconclusive, particularly because the later study is qualitative in 
nature and because it compared those using a different method of credit rather than 
those actually refused a budgeting loan.  Also, another study undertaken after the 
1999 changes based on 2,402 reports from 494 Citizens Advice Bureaux between 
January 1999 and July 2002 found evidence that the fact people are refused a grant 
or a loan from the Social Fund was a poor guide to the degree of need a person or 
family was in, and that many refused applicants were being left without essential 
households items (Barton, 2002). 
 
There is some evidence that cultural factors may have played an important role in 
deterring minority ethnic group applicants.  For example, Sadiq-Sangster (1992) 
found that Asian groups perceived the Social Fund to be at odds with their own 
cultural and collective traditions of providing financial support and consequently they 
were less likely to make applications to the Social Fund.  
 
Some researchers have argued that the success of being awarded a loan or grant is 
more to do with ‘playing the system’ and bears little relationship with need.  They 
argue that applicants can be divided into two groups:  
• those who were familiar with the Social Fund system and played the system 
• those who lacked knowledge or didn’t play the system, and first time applicants. 
 
For the first group it has been found that discretion works well since they know which 
items to ask for or what they need to say to be awarded the money.  However, for the 
second group the contrary is true, and they are less likely to get a loan or grant 
regardless of need because they did not know or understand how the discretionary 
element of the system works (Dalley and Berthoud, 1992).  Whyley et al. (2000) 
found that people ‘play the game’ by applying at certain times of the year when they 
know they are more likely to receive an award or ask for more money than they need 
because they know that they will be awarded less than they ask for.  Rowe (2002) 
drew similar conclusions from interviews with Social Fund officers: more experienced 
applicants, who ‘play the game’ or know for what items they will be given money, will 
get more from the Social Fund and those genuinely in need but who are not 
persistent or do not ask for the right item will get a loan rather than a grant, or no help 
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at all.  Barton (2002) pointed out that the changes to the discretionary Social Fund in 
April 1999 may have exacerbated this issue.  Following the changes, applicants must 
decide which Social Fund payment they wish to apply for given their circumstances 
and therefore the onus is on individuals to know which type of loan or grant they 
should apply for.  Whilst Social Fund staff are meant to consider whether a different 
payment from that applied for would be in the applicants’ interest, Barton found that 
in many cases this did not happen.  The same study found evidence that the people 
most likely to often get no or wrong advice from social security staff are the very 
poor, and often facing long term ill health, very poor housing, or domestic violence.  
The result is that these people apply for the wrong type of payment, are refused, 
and/or having to make repeat applications (Barton, 2002).  
 
Huby and Dix (1992) found that applications for items did not always reflect those 
actually needed.  Seven per cent of the applicants said that the items they needed 
were not the items asked for.  Perceived ideas about what item the Fund would give 
money for often influenced what item people actually put on their application form.  
For example, some had to repay fines or bills or needed help with work related 
expenses, but instead applied for different items, such as washing machines.  Others 
lacked knowledge about what items might optimise their chances: whilst actually 
needing an item given high priority, such as a bed, they applied for money for a 
different item with low priority.  This supports the notion that some people get money 
because they know how to work the system but others, despite being in need, do not 
get money because they do not know how to ‘play the game’.  
 
However, more recent, qualitative research shows that applicants had used their 
loans for the purpose they had put on the application form.  It found no evidence that 
applicants were saying they needed the loan for one purpose but spending it on 
something else (Whyley et al., 2000).  This may reflect the changes to the budgeting 
loan scheme made in April 1999 whereby applicants no longer need to justify their 
need for the item for which they want the loan. 
 
An early study monitoring the impact of the Social Fund on social work agencies 
found that applicants who had sought independent advice in approaching the Fund 
were more likely to ask for grants than for loans and that applications were more 
often successful when supported by a social worker or welfare rights office (Stewart 
et al., 1989).  The extent of social worker co-operation with the Social Fund can also 
lead to local variation in Social Fund applications and outcomes (Becker, 1989).  
Huby and Walker (1991) argued that potential applicants with access to a source of 
charitable help were less likely to receive a Social Fund award because Social Fund 
officers had to make a decision with regard to ‘the possibility that some other person 
or body may wholly or partly meet the need’.  Indeed, they argued that the impact of 
different organisations on Social Fund applications and outcomes varied in different 
parts of the country, and this contributed to the potential for individuals with similar 
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needs to be given different treatment under the Social Fund (Huby and Walker, 
1991). 
 
2.7 Repaying the loan 
 
When the scheme was introduced in 1988, there was some concern about the 
replacement of grants by loans (Whyley et al., 2000).  Some critics questioned 
whether loans should be provided to the very poorest people or be an integral part of 
social security arrangements (for example, Huby and Dix, 1992).  On the one hand, it 
was argued that the provision of loans might plunge poor people deeper into poverty 
by decreasing their income further.  The very reason why they needed help in the 
first place was because their income was low and a reduction in their income through 
loan repayment might serve to make a bad situation worse.  On the other hand, it 
was argued that debt is an inevitable aspect of life for benefit recipients and therefore 
access to interest free loans steers people away from high interest alternatives.  
 
Research conducted before 1999 has tended to conclude that repaying budgeting 
loans leads to increased hardship.  The Social Fund seems to reinforce poverty by 
placing those already struggling with their weekly income further into debt and further 
reducing their weekly income in order to pay back the loan and leaving them without 
enough money to live on (Smith, 1990; Cohen et al., 1992; Cohen et al., 1996; Huby 
and Dix, 1992).  Huby and Dix (1992) found that 70 per cent of loan recipients said 
that they did not have enough to live on once the loan repayment was deducted from 
their weekly payment, and three-quarters said that they frequently ran out of money.  
 
However, Whyley et al. (2000) found that when people were having difficulty 
managing financially whilst paying off the loan, it was usually because of a change in 
circumstance or an unexpectedly high expense such as a household bill.  
 
There is evidence that in order to pay back the loan, many people get further into 
debt or go without essential items (Huby and Dix, 1992).  Huby and Dix (1992) found 
that because half of the applicants were awarded less than they asked for, 17 per 
cent of successful applicants had to supplement the payment, often through 
commercial loans at high rates of interest.  Others had to buy second hand items that 
were liable to break down (Huby and Dix, 1992).  Other studies have demonstrated 
that shortfall in the amount awarded meant going without, using commercial credit, 
getting help from family or friends, or applying to a charity for help (Kempson et al., 
2002; Whyley et al., 2000).  
 
Repayments are normally set at 15 per cent of the applicable benefit amount, 
excluding housing costs, where the applicant has no other credit commitment or 
arrears to be repaid, but the repayment can be reduced to ten and even five per cent 
of the benefit amount (Kempson et al., 2002).  Much research has demonstrated that, 
regardless of whether they are coping with the repayments or not, the level of 
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budgeting loan repayments has been a long-standing complaint among applicants 
(Huby and Dix, 1992; Kempson et al., 1994; Whyley et al., 2000; Kempson et al., 
2002).  But it has been pointed out that people struggling to repay the loan are in a 
predicament: reducing the repayment rate and extending the period of the loan, both 
possible ways of opening up more income to live on, makes it harder to get another 
loan when it may be needed later (Howard, 2003).  However, it is clear that many 
people do benefit from the loan and are satisfied with the help they get (Smith, 1990; 
Smith, 2003). 
 
Studies have shown that falling behind with commercial loan repayments and running 
up arrears can be a barrier to work (for example, Hales et al., 2000).  Budgeting 
loans have a different impact because people cannot fall behind as repayments are 
made through direct deductions from benefits (Howard, 2003).  Indeed, qualitative 
research has shown that repayment by direct deduction from benefit is regarded as 
an advantage of budgeting loans by those who have claimed them (Whyley et al., 
2000; Smith, 1990).  But once claimants leave benefits, these deductions can no 
longer be made, which can result in delays and difficulties in recovering outstanding 
amounts (Buck, 2000) and can be a worry for claimants. 
 
2.8 Unsuccessful applicants - how do they manage?  
 
There are few studies of what happens to people who have their application to the 
Social Fund turned down.  One way forward is the review procedure, but obviously 
applicants can still be turned down after that.  Qualitative research by Whyley et al. 
(2000) with users of budgeting loans and credit unions identified a hierarchy of 
acceptability of the various strategies for raising money for items that could not be 
met out of the household budget.  They were: 
• savings, credit union loan friends and family 
• budgeting loan, mail order 
• weekly collected credit, sell and buy-back, pawnbroker 
• rental purchase, withdrawing credit union savings 
• ‘loan sharks’. 
 
The Social Fund was placed second in this hierarchy.  Those refused a budgeting 
loan could therefore, in theory, turn to other strategies for raising money.  But many 
of the alternatives have disadvantages that outweigh any advantage to using the 
source and are not really a ‘real’ alternative. 
 
Huby and Dix (1992) studied how respondents refused Social Fund awards coped.  
Those not awarded a loan were asked almost six months after their refusal whether 
they still had the same needs.  Twenty-eight per cent had met their needs from other 
sources, 35 per cent had given up trying and 37 per cent were still trying to find the 
money they needed.  Those who could remember how they met their needs (only 26 
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people) had mostly found money from their regular income but had also borrowed 
from friends or were given items from relatives or friends.  Only one had borrowed 
from a bank.  Half of the people who were still trying to meet the same needs six 
months later were trying to find money from their regular income.  Twenty per cent of 
all those still trying to meet the same needs six months later, and 36 per cent of lone 
parents in this position, were reapplying to the DSS.  Fourteen per cent overall, and 
26 per cent of couples with children, were postponing other payments.  Other studies 
have found that people who are unsuccessful in their application to the Social Fund 
frequently turn to charities (Cohen et al., 1996; Barton, 2002).  Whyley et al.’s (2000) 
small scale qualitative study found that only three people had been turned down for a 
loan and they were coping by borrowing money or items from friends or relatives. 
 
2.9 Conclusions 
 
There is a wealth of literature on the administration of the Social Fund, much of it 
focused on decision-making, the use of discretion and the implications of the annual 
budgeting.  By comparison, there has been much less research on Social Fund 
applicants.  Moreover, much of the research on applicants is now somewhat dated 
and was conducted prior to the April 1999 changes to the scheme.  There have been 
a number of important qualitative studies of claimant circumstances and experiences 
in recent years, but relatively few quantitative studies.  Moreover, with a few 
exceptions, the research on claimants has been cross-sectional rather than 
longitudinal.  That is to say, most of the research has focused on claimants at one 
point in time rather than looking at them over a period of time. 
 
The creation of the Families and Children Study (FACS) presents a new opportunity 
to undertake in-depth, statistical analysis of the use of the Social Fund by families 
with children under the post-April 1999 scheme.  FACS makes it possible to examine 
the circumstances, debt characteristics, household budgeting methods and degree of 
hardship of Social Fund applicants.  It also makes it possible to compare the 
characteristics and circumstances of applicants with those of non-applicants. 
Comparison between one-off and repeat applicants may also be made with this 
study.  And, most importantly, the panel element of the study presents the 
opportunity to explore the outcomes of Social Fund loans over time. 
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3 HOW MUCH USE IS MADE OF THE SOCIAL FUND? 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter looks at how much use is made of Social Fund loans.  It has three 
sections.  The first summarises the most recent administrative statistics on 
applications and awards of budgeting loans.  The second section analyses survey 
data to examine the extent to which different types of benefit recipients make use of 
the loans.  The final section also draws on survey data to examine the pattern of 
applications to the Social Fund over time, focusing on families with children for the 
years from 2000 to 2002. 
 
3.2 Applications to the Social Fund 
 
Income Support and income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance recipients make 
considerable use of budgeting loans.  The most recent annual report on the Social 
Fund by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions provides details of 
applications and awards for the financial year 2002/03 (DWP, 2003).  During that 
year, the Department for Work and Pensions received 1.77 million applications for 
budgeting loans.  In the same period, 1.25 million awards were made, an application 
success rate of 71 per cent when calculated as a proportion of the number of 
decisions made.  The average size of budgeting loan awarded to successful 
applicants was £366.  The total gross expenditure on budgeting loans during 2002/03 
was £461.8 million.  In the same period, £458.2 million was recovered in loan 
repayments from borrowers.  Hence the net expenditure on budgeting loans during 
the year was only £3.6 million (Table 3.1). 
 
Table 3.1 Social Fund budgeting loans in 2002/03: applications, awards and 
expenditure 
 
Applications (000s) 1,774 
- Awards (000s) 1,251 
- Refusals (000s) 466 
Awards as % of decisions 71% 
Gross expenditure £m £461.8m 
Recoveries £m £458.2m 
Net expenditure £m £3.6m 
Average award £ £366 
Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2003), Annex 1. 
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Gross expenditure on budgeting loans varies significantly between different client 
groups.  During 2002/03, it ranged from just £22 million in loans to pensioners, to 
£231 million in loans to lone parents.  While pensioners accounted for only five per 
cent of gross expenditure, lone parents accounted for 50 per cent.  Applicants 
classified as disabled received 28 per cent of all expenditure during the year and the 
unemployed accounted for eight per cent (Table 3.2).  For the purposes of these 
figures, lone parents with a disability premium are classified as disabled rather than 
as lone parents.  Unemployed applicants who are disabled or receive a lone parent 
premium are classified as unemployed. 
 
Table 3.2 Expenditure on budgeting loans by applicant group, 2002/03 
 £m %
Pensioners 21.8 5
Unemployed 37.8 8
Disabled 130.3 28
Lone parents 231.1 50
Others 40.8 9
Total 461.8 100
Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2003), Annex 3. 
 
There is also considerable variation in budgeting loan awards between different 
family types (Table 3.3).  In the first place, far more single people receive a Social 
Fund budgeting loan than do couples.  During 2002/03, single people accounted for 
85 per cent of all budgeting loan awards, while couples received only 15 per cent.  
Secondly, far more families with children received a budgeting loan than did people 
without children.  During 2002/03, £319 million was awarded to lone parents and 
couples with children; this accounted for 70 per cent of all gross expenditure on 
Social Fund budgeting loans during that year.  Meanwhile, the amount awarded to 
single people and couples without dependent children was £136 million or 30 per 
cent of total expenditure. 
 
Table 3.3 Budgeting loan awards by family type, 2002/03 
 No. of 
awards 
(000s)
% of 
awards
Expenditure 
£m 
% of 
expenditure
Single person 421 34 114.5 25
Single person with children 633 51 259.4 57
Couple 60 5 21.4 5
Couple with children 126 10 59.6 13
Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2003), Annex 6. 
 
Irrespective of family type, people who had been on benefit for over 36 weeks 
accounted for a greater share of awards, and on average received a larger award, 
than those who had been on benefit from less time than that time.  For example, 
during 2002/03, single people with children who had been on benefit for over 36 
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weeks accounted for £394 million pounds of budgeting loans (32 per cent of all 
budgeting loans) and on average received a loan to the value of £414.  By contrast, 
single people with children who had been on benefit for less than that time, 
accounted for £240 million pounds in budgeting loans (19 per cent of the total) and 
on average received £400 in loan (DWP, 2003).  Thus, longer-term claimants of 
Income Support and income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance account for more 
budgeting loan expenditure and receive larger loan amounts than shorter-term 
claimants. 
 
Although the application success rate for Social Fund budgeting loans was relatively 
high, 466,000 applications were refused in 2002/03.  Table 3.4 shows the main 
reason why such applications were turned down.  Just over half of all refusals (55 per 
cent) were made because the applicant had outstanding debt.  The next most 
common reason for refusal (28 per cent) was in respect of applications for budgeting 
loans made by people who were not in receipt of one of the two qualifying benefits for 
the requisite minimum period of 26 weeks.  In addition, 14 per cent of refusals were 
because the applicant was not in receipt of a qualifying benefit.   
 
Table 3.4 Budgeting loan applications by reason for refusal, 2002/03 
Reason No. %
Excluded items 1,600 21
Outstanding debt 258,800 55
Not on IS/JSA (IB) 65,300 14
Not on IS/JSA (IB) for 26 weeks 136,800 29
Other 3,800 1
Total 466,400 100
Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2003), Annex 8. 
 
It is clear from these figures that a significant proportion of refusals for budgeting 
loans arise because the applicant is in fact not eligible to apply for such loans, either 
because they are not in receipt of a qualifying benefit or have not been in receipt of 
one for a long enough period.  When applicants who were not eligible for a budgeting 
loan - i.e., those not in receipt of a qualifying benefit (65,000) and those not in receipt 
of either benefit for at least 26 weeks (136,800) - are taken out of the equation, the 
application success rate rises to 83 per cent of eligible applicants. 
 
Successful applicants for Social Fund loans have to repay the money advanced to 
them.  While the recipient remains on benefit, the loan is automatically deducted from 
their weekly benefit.  As at February 2003, 818,00 deductions for Social Fund 
(budgeting and crisis) loans repayments were being made from Income Support and 
another 114,000 from income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance.  The average weekly 
deduction at that date was £10.58 from Income Support and £7.24 from income-
based Jobseeker’s Allowance (DWP, 2003).  
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Loans are not only deducted from the two qualifying benefits of Income Support and 
income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance; they are recoverable from all social security 
benefits other than Child Benefit, Guardians Allowance and Attendance Allowance 
(DWP, 2003).  If the loan recipient moves off benefits, the money is recovered 
directly from them.  However, as Table 3.5 shows, the vast majority of money 
recovered in budgeting loan repayments (88 per cent) was collected from direct 
deductions of Income Support.  Repayments in cash accounted for only 2.7 per cent 
of monies recovered. 
 
Table 3.5 Repayment source for Social Fund budgeting loans, 2002/03 
Source 
Amount recovered
£m %
Income Support 405.0 88
Jobseeker’s Allowance 34.7 8
Other benefits 6.2 1
Cash 12.3 3
Total 458.2 100
Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2003), Annex 11. 
 
 
3.3 Who makes most use of budgeting loans? 
 
The figures presented above show that lone parents account for a very large share of 
all budgeting loans while pensioners account for a small proportion.  What this does 
not tell us is what proportion of the different client groups apply to the Social Fund for 
a budgeting loan.  For the purpose of the present research, it is important to 
ascertain the extent to which families with children make use of budgeting loans and 
how this compares with other client groups.  In order to address this question, 
analysis was undertaken of the Family Resources Survey. 
 
The Family Resources Survey (FRS) is an annual survey of households in Great 
Britain conducted on behalf of the Department for Work and Pensions.  It is based on 
interviews with approximately 24,000 households each year.  This section draws on 
the 2001/02 edition of the survey (and to a lesser extent on the Households Below 
Average Income data set which is derived from it).  The results presented here are 
based on an analysis of benefit units rather than households (a benefit unit is a single 
person or couple living as married and any dependent children). 
 
Analysis of the FRS for 2001/02 shows that seven per cent of respondents in receipt 
of a qualifying benefit at the time of the survey said they had received a Social Fund 
budgeting loan in the previous six months.  In addition, two per cent said they had 
received a crisis loan and one per cent had received a community care grant in the 
previous six months.  At the time of the interview, 17 per cent of respondents on 
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Income Support were repaying a Social Fund loan, as were two per cent of 
respondents on income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance.  Families with children were 
much more likely to be repaying a Social Fund loan than those without children.  
Altogether, 35 per cent of all benefit units with dependent children on Income Support 
were repaying a loan compared with only eight per cent of those without children.  As 
we show in Chapter 4, many of the events that appear to trigger applications to the 
Social Fund are associated with child life-stage transitions. 
 
The remainder of this section focuses on respondents in the FRS who are in receipt 
of either Income Support or income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance, comparing benefit 
units that are repaying a Social Fund loan with those who are not.  We focus initially 
on the composition of loan re-payers and then look at the incidence of loan 
repayment among particular types of benefit unit. It is not possible to tell from the 
FRS whether the respondent was repaying a budgeting loan or a crisis loan.  
However, since far more budgeting than crisis loans are awarded each year, the 
great majority of respondents were probably repaying a budgeting loan. 
 
Table 3.6 shows the family type composition of benefit units in receipt of qualifying 
benefits that were repaying a Social Fund loan at the time of their FRS interview and 
compares them with benefit recipients that were not repaying a loan at that time.  
Although the family type categories are not exactly the same as those presented in 
the Secretary of State’s annual report on the Social Fund, the figures are consistent 
with them.  About half (52 per cent) of all benefits units who reported that they were 
repaying a loan in the 2001/02 FRS were lone parents.  By contrast, only 19 per cent 
of those not repaying a loan were lone parents.  Pensioners accounted for five per 
cent of those repaying a loan but as many as 34 per cent of those who were not 
repaying a loan.  This confirms that lone parents account for a disproportionately 
large share benefits units making use of the Social Fund loans, while pensioners 
account for small share.  
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Table 3.6 Family type by whether or not repaying a Social Fund loan 
 Column percentages
Repaying a loan Family type Yes No 
Pensioner couple 1 4 
Single pensioner 4 30 
Couple with children 12 7 
Childless couple 7 9 
Single with children 52 19 
Single without children 25 31 
Unweighted base 754 3021 
Base: Income Support and income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance recipients  
Source: Family Resources Survey 2001/02 (own analysis). 
 
Table 3.7 compares those repaying a loan with those who are not by the age of the 
head of the benefit unit.  This again shows that older claimants account for a 
disproportionately low share of those making use of Social Fund loans.  However, it 
also indicates that this is especially true of the old elderly, those aged 75 and over.  
One per cent of those repaying a loan was aged 75 or over, compared with 18 per 
cent of those not repaying a loan.  The figures for those aged from 60 to 74 were 
seven per cent and 23 per cent respectively.  By contrast, younger claimants account 
for a relatively large number of people making use of Social Fund loans.  For 
example, benefit units headed by a young adult aged between 18 and 24 accounted 
for 19 per cent of those repaying a loan but only eight per cent of those not repaying 
a loan. 
 
Table 3.7 Age of head of benefit unit by whether or not repaying a Social Fund 
loan 
 Column percentages
Repaying a loan Age of head of benefit unit Yes No 
18 to 24 19 8 
25 to 44 58 31 
45 to 59 17 21 
60 to 74 7 23 
75 or over 1 18 
Unweighted base 754 3021 
Base: Income Support and income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance recipients 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2001/02 (own analysis). 
 
Table 3.8 shows the ethnic group of benefit units repaying a Social Fund loan 
compared with those not repaying a loan at the time of their interview in the 2001/02 
FRS.  Because of small sample sizes it has been necessary to collapse the minority 
ethnic group categories into larger aggregations.  While this makes analysis possible, 
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it does have the disadvantage of hiding variations in use of the Social Fund among 
the different minority ethnic groups that comprise each of these broad categories.  
Bearing this important qualification in mind, the results show that people with an 
Asian or Asian British ethnic background accounted for a significantly smaller share 
of those repaying a loan than of those who were not repaying one.  Meanwhile, 
people who described their ethnic group as being white accounted for a slightly larger 
share of the group repaying loans than of those not repaying loans.  The other 
broadly defined ethnic groups accounted for a similar proportion of benefit units 
repaying a loan and those not doing so at the time of the survey. 
 
Table 3.8 Ethnic groups of head of benefit unit by whether or not repaying a 
Social Fund loan 
 Column percentages
Repaying a loan Ethnic group of head of benefit 
unit Yes No 
White 91 86 
Asian or Asian British 1 6 
Black or Black British 5 4 
Other 3 3 
Unweighted base 754 3021 
Base: Income Support and income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance recipients 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2001/02 (own analysis). 
 
Table 3.9 compares the economic status of benefit units by whether or not they were 
repaying a Social Fund loan.  Benefit units where the head or spouse was 
unemployed accounted for a similar proportion of both groups: 15 per cent of those 
repaying a loan and 13 per cent of those not repaying a loan were unemployed.  
Those in part-time employment (less than 16 hours per week) also accounted for a 
similar proportion of both groups: four and three per cent respectively.  Meanwhile, 
benefit units in which the head or spouse was sick or disabled accounted for a 
significantly larger share of those repaying a loan (40 per cent) than of those not 
repaying a loan (29 per cent).  The same was true of the ‘other’ category, which 
includes benefit units headed by a lone parent: this group accounted for 33 per cent 
of those repaying a loan but only 14 per cent of those who were not.  Once again, 
benefit units where the head or spouse was aged 60 or more accounted for a much 
lower proportion of those repaying a Social Fund loan (7 per cent) than of those not 
repaying one (41 per cent). 
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Table 3.9 Economic status by whether or not repaying a Social Fund loan 
Column percentages
Repaying a loan Economic status of benefit unit Yes No 
1 or 2 adults, at least 1 in part-time work 4 3 
1 or 2 adults, head or spouse unemployed 15 13 
1 or 2 adults, head or spouse sick or disabled 40 29 
1 or 2 adults, head or spouse aged 60+ 7 41 
Other 33 14 
Unweighted base 754 3021 
Base: Income Support and income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance recipients 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2001/02 (own analysis). 
 
Finally, whether or not benefit units were repaying a Social Fund loan was related to 
savings and income.  Ninety per cent of benefit units repaying a loan had no savings, 
compared with 67 per cent of those who were not repaying a loan.  Meanwhile, 83 
per cent of benefit units repaying a loan were in the bottom three income deciles 
(equivalised, after housing costs), compared with 66 per cent among those who were 
not repaying a loan.   
 
Having looked at the composition of Social Fund loan re-payers and compared them 
with benefit units that were not repaying a loan, the analysis now turns to the 
incidence of loan repayment among different types of benefit unit receiving Income 
Support or Jobseeker’s Allowance.  In other words, it shows the proportion of 
different types of benefit unit that were repaying a loan in 2001/02.  
 
In total, 20 per cent of Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance recipients were 
repaying a loan when interviewed for the 2001/02 FRS.  Table 3.10 shows how the 
proportion repaying a loan varies by type of family.  It confirms that couples with 
children and especially single people with children were significantly more likely than 
other family types to be repaying a loan: 40 per cent of lone parents and 28 per cent 
of couples with children were doing so.  By contrast only three per cent of both single 
pensioners and pensioner couples were repaying a loan.  The proportion of both 
single people (16 per cent) and couples without children (16 per cent) repaying a 
Social Fund loan was also below average.  Thus, there are significant variations in 
the use of the Social Fund by family type. 
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Table 3.10 Proportions of different family types repaying a Social Fund loan 
 Row percentages
Family type Repaying a loan Unweighted base 
Pensioner couple 3 146 
Single pensioner 3 976 
Couple with children 28 337 
Childless couple 16 295 
Single with children 40 1084 
Single without children 16 937 
All 20 3775 
Base: Income Support and income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance recipients in each family 
type 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2001/02 (own analysis). 
 
The proportion of benefit units repaying a loan also varied by age of the head of 
benefit unit (Table 3.11).  Broadly similar proportions of young adults aged 18 to 24 
(36 per cent) and younger middle-aged (25 to 44) heads of benefit unit (31 per cent) 
were repaying a Social Fund loan.  The proportion repaying a loan fell by about half 
to only 16 per cent among older middle-aged (45 to 59) heads of benefit unit.  Among 
those aged from 60 to 74, the figure was half again at seven per cent, while among 
those aged 75 and over it was only one per cent.  Thus, the proportion of heads of 
benefit unit making use of Social Fund loans falls in quite pronounced steps as age 
group increases.  Whether this decline is because the need to make lumpy 
expenditures decreases, because financial resources increase, or attitudes to 
borrowing money change over time, is unclear.  However, the sharp fall between 
early and late middle age approximately coincides with the end of child rearing. 
 
Table 3.11 Proportion of different age groups repaying a Social Fund loan 
 Row percentages
Age of head of benefit unit Repaying a loan Unweighted base 
18 to 24 36 353 
25 to 44 31 1390 
45 to 59 16 715 
60 to 74 7 735 
75 and over 1 582 
All 20 3775 
Base: Income Support and income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance recipients in each family 
type 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2001/02 (own analysis). 
 
Table 3.12 shows the proportion of respondents from different ethnic backgrounds 
that were repaying a loan.  One column shows the proportion among all respondents 
in receipt of Income Support and income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance and another 
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just for those respondents with dependent children.  The proportion of respondents 
repaying a Social Fund loan who described their ethnic background as white (20 per 
cent), Black or Black British (22 per cent) or ‘other’ (17 per cent) was the same or 
similar to the average for all benefit units.  In contrast, only four per cent of 
respondents whose ethnic background was Asian or Asian British were repaying a 
loan.  This confirms that people of Asian origin make far less use of Social Fund 
loans than people of other ethnic origins.   
 
Table 3.12 Proportion of different ethnic groups repaying a Social Fund loan 
Row percentages
All IS and JSA recipients Families with children on IS or JSA Ethnic group of head 
of benefit unit 
% Unweighted base % 
Unweighted 
base 
White 20 3308 39 1263 
Asian or Asian British 4 196 5 128 
Black or Black British 22 162 34 79 
Other 17 109 23 69 
All 20 3775 35 1539 
Base: Income Support and income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance recipients in each family 
type 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2001/02 (own analysis) 
 
A broadly similar pattern applies when the analysis is confined to benefit units 
containing children.  The main difference is that families with children whose ethnic 
background falls into the ‘other’ category are also under-represented compared with 
families as a whole, but not to the same extent as those that are Asian or Asian 
British.  Only five per cent of Asian or Asian British families with children were 
repaying a Social Fund loan in 2001/02. 
 
The proportion repaying a loan varies according to the economic status of the benefit 
unit.  In line with the previous findings, only four per cent of benefit units with a head 
or spouse aged 60 or over were repaying a loan at the time of the survey.  The 
proportion of benefit units where the head or spouse was unemployed and repaying 
a loan (22 per cent) was similar to the average for all benefit units; among benefit 
units where at least one adult was in part-time work and repaying a loan (23 per cent) 
it was a little higher than the average.  However, among sick or disabled (25 per 
cent) benefit units and those in the other category (36 per cent), the proportion 
repaying a Social Fund loan was significantly higher than the average. 
 
Use of Social Fund loans also varied according to income and savings.  Some 24 per 
cent of recipients of qualifying benefits without savings were repaying a loan at the 
time of the survey.  However, among those with savings of up to £250, the proportion 
repaying a loan was only 13 per cent.  Thus even quite modest savings appear to be 
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a protective factor against the need to make use of the Social Fund.  In the bottom 
three income deciles, 23 per cent of benefit units were repaying a loan, compared 
with ten per cent of benefit units in the top seven income deciles.  
 
The analysis in this section so far has indicated that certain types of Income Support 
and income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance recipients are more likely than others to 
make use of the Social Fund to borrow money.  Young adults and young middle-
aged people, lone parents and sick or disabled people, are the most common users 
of Social Fund loans.  Pensioners and benefit units headed by people of Asian or 
Asian British background are the least likely to draw on the Social Fund as a source 
of borrowed money.  However, these categories clearly overlap to a significant 
extent.  For example, many lone parents are young adults, while relatively few are 
pensioners. Multivariate statistical techniques such as logistic regression can identify 
the importance of each of these categories independently of the others. 
 
A range of social, economic and demographic variables were entered into logistic 
regression models in order to predict the odds that benefit units having particular 
characteristics were repaying a Social Fund loan.  This shows that, holding other 
factors constant, the factors that best explained whether or not a benefit unit was 
repaying a loan were: 
• The presence of children – benefit units with children were more likely to be 
repaying a loan than those without children. 
• The age of head of benefit unit – the odds of repaying a loan decreased by the 
age of the head of the benefit unit. 
• Ethnic background of head of benefit unit – those headed by people with a non-
white ethnic background were less likely to be repaying a loan than those 
headed by a white person. 
• The presence of a sick adult – benefit units with a sick adult were more likely 
than those without to be repaying a loan. 
• The presence of a sick child – families with a sick child were more likely than 
those without to be repaying a loan. 
• Savings  – benefit units with no savings were much more likely to be repaying a 
loan than those with savings. 
• Access to a car – benefit units with access to a car were less likely to be 
repaying a loan than those that did have such access. 
• Having a current account at a bank or building society – benefit units with a 
current account were less likely than those without to be repaying a loan. 
 
 
3.4 Applications to the Social Fund 2000 to 2002 
 
In this section we look at the pattern of applications by families with children to the 
Social Fund over time.  It does so by analysing the Families and Children Study 
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(FACS) for the years from 2000 to 2002.  Because FACS is a panel survey, it is 
possible to examine whether or not families that apply to the Social Fund for a loan in 
one year do so in other years.  In particular, it is possible to identify whether people 
are one-off or repeat applicants. 
 
FACS asks respondents a number of questions about their use of the Social Fund.  
These questions are included in a block of the questionnaire asked of people who 
are receiving Income Support, one of the two qualifying benefits for the Social Fund.  
Respondents on income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance (the other qualifying benefit) 
are not asked these questions.  However, because the survey is very mother-
focused, relatively few respondents are in receipt of income-based Jobseeker’s 
Allowance.  In 2000, for example, only 2.5 per cent of all respondents were receiving 
income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance compared with 29.5 per cent who were on 
Income Support.   
 
First of all, the survey asks respondents on Income Support whether, during the past 
12 months, they have applied to the Department for Work and Pensions, for a grant 
of money (not a loan) to pay for something that they needed.  If the respondent has 
applied for a grant, they are asked what it was for and whether the request was 
successful.  Next, the survey asks respondents on Income Support whether, during 
the past 12 months, they have applied to the Department for Work and Pensions for 
a loan from the Social Fund (not a grant) to pay for something they needed.  In both 
1999 and 2000, respondents were not asked whether their application was 
successful, but from 2001 they were asked this.  One limitation of the FACS survey is 
that it is not possible to ascertain whether the loan was a budgeting loan or a crisis 
loan.  Finally, the survey asks respondents on Income Support whether any 
deductions are being made from their weekly benefit payment for Social Fund loans, 
electricity bills, and things like that.  If they do have such deductions, they are asked 
what they are for and how much is deducted each week from their benefit payment.  
One minor limitation here is that it is not possible to tell from FACS what proportion of 
people who have moved from benefit into work are still repaying a Social Fund loan. 
 
Table 3.13 shows the responses to these questions for the years from 2000 to 2002 
inclusive.  The responses for loans are fairly consistent across all three years.  Each 
year, four out of ten Income Support recipients applies to the Social Fund for a loan.  
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Table 3.13 Whether Income Support recipients had applied to the Social Fund in 
the past 12 months or currently had a deduction from their benefit to 
repay a Social Fund loan 
Base: Income Support recipients 
Source: Families and Children Survey, 2000 to 2002 (own analysis) 
 
Thus the gross take-up of Social Fund loans in terms of applications among Income 
Support recipients is approximately 40 per cent.  However, this figure is an under-
estimate of the true take-up rate for Social Fund loan applications because not all 
Income Support recipients will necessarily be in need of one.  It could be argued that 
the true take-up rate is the percentage of Income Support recipients who need a 
money loan - either to tide them over a crisis or to help them budget for a one-off 
expense - who fail to apply to the Social Fund for one.  Defined in this way, the true 
take-up rate for applications to the Social Fund is likely to be much higher than 40 
per cent. 
 
The proportion of Social Fund applicants who get a loan is also fairly stable over the 
two years - and very high.  In both 2001 and 2002 (the question was not asked prior 
to that) about nine out of ten Income Support recipients who had applied to the Social 
Fund for a loan, received one.  This does not necessarily mean that the application 
success rate is around 90 per cent because it is impossible to tell from the survey 
how many applications for a Social Fund loan had been made in the previous 12 
months.  For example, a respondent might have applied on two occasions but been 
successful only once during the 12 month period, giving an application success rate 
of 50 per cent.  Nevertheless, it is possible to state that nine out of ten Income 
Support recipients who apply to the Social Fund for a loan during the year do get 
one.  This compares with an application success rate of 83 per cent among all 
eligible applicants (not just eligible family applicants) on Income Support or income-
based Jobseeker’s Allowance calculated from the statistics in the Secretary of State’s 
annual report on the Social Fund (see above). 
 
The proportion of Income Support recipients that have a deduction from their benefit 
to repay a Social Fund loan is also fairly stable from year to year at about four out of 
ten.  This is the same as the proportion of Income Support recipients who apply for a 
loan during the year.  The congruence between these two sets of figures is hardly 
 2000 2001 2002 
 % Unweighted base % 
Unweighted 
base % 
Unweighted 
base 
Applied for a SF loan 40 548 39 501 39 508 
Received a SF loan NA NA 93 456 91 458 
Deduction for SF loan 37 504 39 509 40 519 
Applied for a SF grant 19 257 17 222 12 187 
Received a SF grant 62 159 66 141 59 110 
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surprising given the very high proportion of people applying for a loan during the 
course of a year who get one.  At the same time, many of these deductions will be to 
repay a Social Fund loan that was awarded in the previous 12 months, the period in 
respect of which respondents were asked if they had applied for a loan.  
 
Not surprisingly, therefore, many Income Support recipients who applied for a Social 
Fund loan during the previous 12 months were also repaying a loan (possibly one 
they had applied for in that period) by deduction from their benefit at the time of the 
survey.  In FACS 2000, for example, three-quarters (76 per cent) of Income Support 
recipients who had applied for a Social Fund loan in the previous 12 months were 
repaying one by deduction from their benefit at the time of the survey.  Looked at the 
other way around, eight out of ten (83 per cent) Income Support recipients who were 
repaying a Social Fund loan at the time of their interview had applied for one in the 
previous 12 months. 
 
The responses to the questions about Social Fund grants are not quite so stable as 
for loans.  Nonetheless, between one and two out of ten Income Support recipients 
applies to the Department for Work and Pensions each year for a Social Fund grant.  
About six out of ten Income Support recipients who have applied for a grant in the 
previous 12 months do get one.  Again, it is not known how many applications each 
person made and therefore what the success rate is.   
 
The sample numbers of applicants for a loan and of those who are repaying a loan 
by deduction from their benefit payment are sufficient to enable analysis to be made 
of these two groups.  But because the proportion of people who apply for a loan who 
do not get one is quite low, it is not possible to analyse unsuccessful applicants.   
 
The fact that an important facet of the study is the panel sample of families means 
that it is possible to use FACS to examine repeat applicants.  Repeat applicants can 
be defined as people who make an application two years running or, alternatively, as 
people who make an application in more than one year but not necessarily in 
consecutive years. 
 
As is clear from Table 3.14, just over half of the people receiving Income Support at 
one or more of the interviews from 2000 to 2002 had applied for a loan from the 
Social Fund.  About three out of ten applied in more than one of these years.  Apart 
from those who did not apply in any of the three years, the sample number in each 
category in the table is fairly small, so it is necessary to aggregate them to some 
extent to make analysis feasible. 
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Table 3.14 Years of application to the Social Fund for a loan 
Base: Respondents interviewed in all three waves from 2000 to 2002 who were on Income 
Support at one or more interviews. 
Source: Families and Children Survey, 2000 to 2002 (own analysis). 
 
Table 3.15 presents a summary view of how many years, if at all, people who were 
on Income Support (not necessarily continuously) had applied to the Social Fund for 
a loan between 2000 and 2002.  A quarter of them had applied to the Social Fund in 
one year only, one in six had applied in two of the years, and one in ten had applied 
in all three years.  This data indicates that a considerable proportion of Income 
Support recipients are repeat applicants to the Social Fund, though only a small 
minority (nine per cent between 2000 and 2002) are serial applicants applying every 
year. 
 
Table 3.15 Number of year in which respondents applied to the Social Fund for a 
loan, from 2000 to 2002 
 Frequency
Applied for a Social Fund loan in: 
 one year only 25
 two years 18
 all three years 9
Did not apply 48
Unweighted base 1194
Base: Respondents interviewed in all three waves from 2000 to 2002 who were on Income 
Support at one or more interviews. 
Source: Families and Children Survey, 2000 to 2002 (own analysis). 
 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
Considerable use is made of the Social Fund by people who are in receipt of one of 
the two qualifying benefits.  In the financial year from 1 April 2002 to 31 March 2003, 
the Department for Work and Pensions advanced £462 million in budgeting loans to 
 Frequency
2000  13
2000 + 2001 7
2000 + 2001 + 2002 9
2000 + 2002 4
2001  6
2001 + 2002 7
2002  7
Did not apply 48
Unweighted base 1194
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1.25 million people.  The net cost - gross expenditure minus loan recoveries - was 
only £3.6 million or £2.88 for an average loan of £366.  About one in 20 benefit units 
in receipt of qualifying benefits was repaying a Social Fund loan in 2001/02, but use 
of the Fund varied significantly across the different categories of benefit recipient.  In 
particular, parents and especially lone parents, sick and disabled people, and 
younger people were especially likely to apply for a loan.  Meanwhile, pensioners and 
people of Asian or Asian British origin were relatively low applicants for Social Fund 
loans.  While some people never apply to the Fund and others make only one-off 
applications, a minority of people on qualifying benefits make repeated applications.  
The next chapter looks at the characteristics of Social Fund loan customers in more 
detail. 
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4 WHICH FAMILIES MAKE USE OF SOCIAL FUND LOANS? 
 
 
This chapter examines the characteristics and circumstances of Income Support 
recipients who were Social Fund customers at the time of their interview.  For the 
purpose of this chapter, a ‘Social Fund customer’ is defined as an Income Support 
recipient who had applied for a loan from the Social Fund in the previous 12 months 
or currently had a deduction from their benefit to repay a Social Fund loan.   
 
Income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance recipients are not asked about the Social Fund 
and hence are excluded from this analysis.  Also excluded for data limitation reasons 
are people who are repaying a Social Fund loan but have moved off Income Support.  
FACS asks about loans but does not distinguish between budgeting and crisis loans.  
As elsewhere in the report, all differences referred to in the text are statistically 
significant (at the 95 per cent confidence level or above). 
 
Drawing on the FACS 2002 survey data, the chapter looks at who applies to the 
Social Fund for a loan, compares the socio-demographic characteristics of Social 
Fund customers with other Income Support recipients, and examines the financial 
circumstances of these two groups, focusing particularly on savings, debt and money 
management.  The chapter also compares the characteristics and circumstances of 
repeat and one-off applicants for Social Fund loans, drawing on the FACS data for 
the three years from 2000 to 2002. 
 
4.1 Social Fund loan customers 
 
In total, one in six (16 per cent) respondents to the FACS 2002 (wave 4) were on 
Income Support at the time of their interview.  Of these, 39 per cent had applied to 
the Social Fund for a loan in the previous 12 months.  In addition, 40 per cent of 
Income Support recipients were repaying a Social Fund loan by deduction from their 
benefit.   
 
These two groups - those who had applied for a loan in the previous 12 months and 
those repaying a loan at the time of the survey - overlapped.  Eight out of ten (81 per 
cent) of people who had applied for a Social Fund loan were repaying a loan at the 
time of the survey.  By contrast, only 14 per cent people who had not applied for a 
loan in the previous year were currently repaying a loan.  The overlap between 
applicants and those repaying a loan is hardly surprising.  In the first place, most of 
the successful applicants would have begun repaying their loan by the time they 
were interviewed.  And secondly, in some cases the overlap will have been because 
some Income Support recipients are repeat applicants, a subject that is explored in 
later in the chapter. 
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Table 4.1 groups Income Support recipients into four groups according to whether 
they had applied or not to the Social Fund for a loan and whether or not they had a 
deduction from their benefit to repay a loan.  The table shows that 32 per cent of 
Income Support recipients had applied for a Social Fund loan in the previous 12 
months and were repaying a loan by deduction from their benefit.  A further seven 
per cent had applied for a loan but were not repaying a loan at the time of the survey.  
Meanwhile, nine per cent of respondents had not applied for a loan in the previous 12 
months but were repaying a loan.  
 
Table 4.1 Whether respondent has applied for a Social Fund loan in the past 12 
months or has a deduction from their benefit to repay a Social Fund loan 
Column percentages
 Couples Lone parents Total 
Applied for a loan and has a deduction 26 33 32 
Applied for a loan and has no deduction 4 8 7 
Has not applied for a loan but does have 
a deduction 
6 9 9 
Has neither applied for a loan nor has a 
deduction 
65 50 53 
Unweighted base 221 1027 1238 
Base: Families on Income Support. 
 
Thus, altogether just under half (48 per cent) of all Income Support recipients could 
be described as Social Fund customers.  The remainder (53 per cent) had neither 
applied for a loan in the previous year nor were repaying a loan - and hence were not 
Social Fund customers at that time.  It is evident from these data that the Social Fund 
is playing an important role in the budgetary arrangements of people on Income 
Support.   
 
It is not possible to tell from FACS why some people apply to the Social Fund for a 
loan and others do not.  But it is possible to examine who applies and becomes a 
Social Fund customer.  This is done here by (a) examining the proportion of different 
types of Income Support recipient who were Social Fund customers (section 4.2); 
and (b) by comparing Social Fund customers with those who are not customers 
(section 4.3).  These refer to the incidence and composition respectively of Social 
Fund customers. 
 
4.2 Who applies to the Social Fund for a loan? 
 
Lone parents were significantly more likely to be Social Fund customers than couples 
with children.  Thus, half (50 per cent) of all lone parents on Income Support had 
either applied for a Social Fund loan in the previous 12 months and/or were repaying 
a loan by deduction from their benefit at the time of the survey (Table 4.1).  This 
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compares with a third (35 per cent) of couples with children who were Social Fund 
customers in 2002. 
 
Table 4.2 Age of respondents 
 Column percentages
Age of respondent Social Fund 
customer? 16 to 24 25 to 29 30 to 34 35 to 39 40 & over 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Unweighted base 
 
60 
 
40 
 
278 
 
60 
 
40 
 
186 
 
45 
 
55 
 
269 
 
41 
 
59 
 
242 
 
34 
 
66 
 
335 
Base: Families on Income Support. 
 
Younger Income Support recipients were much more likely to be Social Fund 
customers than older recipients.  As Table 4.2 shows, the proportion of people on 
Income Support who are Social Fund customers declines across the age groups.  
For instance, three-fifths (60 per cent) of recipients aged under 30 were Social Fund 
customers in 2002.  By comparison, among those aged 40 years and above, the 
proportion that was Social Fund customers was only a third (34 per cent).   
 
Table 4.3  Age of youngest child 
 Column percentages
Age of youngest child Social Fund 
customer? 0 to 4 5 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 18 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Unweighted base 
 
53 
 
48 
 
615 
 
48 
 
52 
 
388 
 
34 
 
66 
 
196 
 
35 
 
65 
 
58 
Base: Families on Income Support. 
 
There was no statistically significant relationship between the number of dependent 
children and whether the respondent is a Social Fund customer.  In other words, 
respondents with three or more dependent children were no more likely to be 
customers than those with only one child or those with two children.  However, the 
age of the youngest child does seem to be important.  The younger the youngest 
child, the more likely the respondent was to be a Social Fund customer.  For 
instance, 53 per cent of Income Support recipients with a youngest child aged under 
five years was a Social Fund customer in 2002, compared with only 35 per cent of 
recipients with a youngest child aged from 16 to 18 years (Table 4.3). 
 
Social housing tenants and, to a lesser extent, private tenants were much more likely 
to be Social Fund customers than owner-occupiers or those living under other tenure 
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arrangements.  Thus, 53 per cent of social tenants and 48 per cent of private tenants 
on Income Support were Social Fund customers in 2002, compared with only 16 per 
cent of owner-occupiers (Table 4.4). 
 
Table 4.4 Housing tenure of respondents 
 Column percentages
Housing tenure Social Fund 
customer? Owner-
occupier 
Social tenant Private tenant Other 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Unweighted base 
 
16 
 
84 
 
131 
 
53 
 
47 
 
947 
 
48 
 
52 
 
190 
 
[9] 
 
[91] 
 
34 
Base: Families on Income Support. 
 
Excluding people who had been on Income Support for less than six months (and 
who were therefore not eligible for a loan), there was no relationship between length 
of time on benefit and being a Social Fund customer.  Forty-five per cent of Income 
Support recipients who had been on benefit for between six and 12 months were 
Social Fund customers.  Beyond a year, the likelihood of being a Social Fund 
customer stayed constant at about half of all recipients.  This is a surprising result 
given that it might be expected that, the longer people have been on benefit, the 
more likely their consumer durables will need replacing and the more likely their 
savings (out of which they might be able to pay for them) will have been depleted. 
 
4.3 Social Fund customers compared with other Income Support recipients 
 
The previous section looked at the incidence of being a Social Fund customer among 
different types of family types and circumstances.  This section looks at the 
composition of Social Fund customers and compares them with other Income 
Support recipients. 
 
Because of the differences in the extent to which different groups had become 
customers, the composition of Social Fund customers was different from that of other 
Income Support recipients.  Table 4.5 compares some of the characteristics of Social 
Fund customers with Income Support recipients who were not customers in 2002.   
 
A higher proportion of Social Fund customers compared with other Income Support 
recipients in 2002 were lone parents and a smaller proportion were couples with 
children.  However, there was no statistically significant difference between 
customers and non-customers in terms of the gender of the respondent or the 
number of dependent children living in the household (Table 4.5).   
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Social Fund customers were generally younger than non-customers.  Whereas 27 
per cent of Social Fund customers were aged under 25 years, this was true for only 
16 per cent of other Income Support recipients in 2002.  At the other end of the 
spectrum, only 15 per cent of Social Fund customers were over the age of 40, but 27 
per cent of non-customers were in that age group (Table 4.5). 
 
The age of the youngest child was younger among Social Fund customers than 
among other Income Support recipients in 2002.  Thus, 53 per cent of Social Fund 
customers had a youngest child aged under 5 years old, which compares with only 
43 per cent of non-customers.  Only 14 per cent of customers had a youngest child 
aged 11 or over, but 24 per cent of non-Social fund customers had a youngest child 
in this age group (Table 4.5). 
 
The housing tenure of Social Fund customers was also different from that of other 
Income Support recipients in 2002.  For example, whereas only three per cent of 
customers were owner-occupiers, 15 per cent of non-customers were living in this 
housing tenure; And whereas 81 per cent of Social Fund customers were living in 
social housing, compared with 65 per cent of non-customers.  A similar proportion of 
both groups were renting from a private landlord (Table 4.5).  
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Table 4.5 Characteristics of Social Fund customers and other IS recipients 
Column percentages
 Social Fund customer? Total 
 Yes No  
Gender 
 Female 
   Male 
 Unweighted base 
 
98 
2 
611 
 
96 
4 
699 
 
97 
3 
1310 
Age of respondent 
 16 to 24 
   25 to 29 
    30 to 34 
    35 to 39 
    40 and over 
 Unweighted base 
 
27 
19 
21 
17 
15 
611 
 
16 
12 
23 
22 
27 
699 
 
21 
15 
22 
20 
21 
1310 
Relationship status 
    Lone parent 
   Couple 
 Unweighted base 
 
86 
14 
592 
 
77 
23 
646 
 
82 
19 
1238 
Number of dependent children 
 One  
  Two 
   Three or more 
 Unweighted base 
 
43 
33 
22 
611 
 
44 
33 
23 
699 
 
44 
33 
24 
1310 
Age of youngest child 
 0 to 4 
 5 to 10 
  11 to 15 
 16 to 18 
 Unweighted base 
 
53 
33 
12 
2 
597 
 
43 
33 
20 
4 
660 
 
48 
33 
16 
3 
1257 
Housing tenure 
  Owner-occupier 
    Social tenant 
   Private tenant 
    Other 
 Unweighted base 
 
3 
81 
15 
1 
605 
 
15 
65 
15 
5 
697 
 
10 
73 
15 
2 
1302 
Base: Families on Income Support. 
 
When it comes to health and caring responsibilities, the differences between Social 
Fund customers and other Income Support recipients were not statistically 
significant.  Social Fund customers were as likely as non-customers to have a long-
standing illness, health problem or disability and to have caring responsibilities.  The 
self-perceived health of customers and non-customers over the last 12 months was 
also similar (Table 4.6). 
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Table 4.6 Health and caring responsibilities 
Column percentages
 Social Fund customer? Total 
 Yes No  
Health over last 12 months 
  Good 
     Fairly good 
    Not good  
 Unweighted base 
 
 
43 
36 
21 
611 
 
46 
31 
23 
699 
 
45 
33 
22 
1310 
Long-standing illness, disability or 
health problems 
  Yes – restricts work 
 Yes – does not restrict work 
  No 
 Unweighted base 
 
 
 
27 
8 
66 
611 
 
 
26 
10 
64 
699 
 
 
27 
9 
65 
1310 
Respondent or partner has caring 
responsibilities 
 Yes 
 No 
 Unweighted base 
 
 
8 
92 
611 
 
 
10 
90 
699 
 
 
9 
91 
1310 
 
Base: Families on Income Support.  
 
4.4 Savings 
 
Social Fund budgeting loans are intended to help Income Support recipients (and 
people on income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance) cope with non-regular or lumpy 
items (Howard, 2003) that are difficult to budget for out of their weekly income.  The 
extent to which they need to borrow from the Fund is likely to vary, other things being 
equal, according to the extent to which they have savings.  Those with savings have 
the option of drawing upon them to pay for one-off expenses, but of course those 
without them do not.  Meanwhile, savings of more than £500 (£1,000 if either the 
claimant or partner is aged 60 or more) will usually affect how much loan is made 
available to successful applicants. 
 
Only 43 per cent of Social Fund customers, compared with 60 per cent of other 
Income Support recipients, had a current or savings account in 2002.  Social Fund 
customers were also less likely to have any savings accounts: about half as many 
Social Fund customers as non-customers had a savings account of any kind (17 per 
cent compared with 31 per cent).  Social Fund customers were also much less likely 
than other Income Support recipients to save regularly.  Only nine per cent of Social 
Fund customers saved regularly, compared with 16 per cent of non-customers (Table 
4.7). 
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Among those who did have savings, Social Fund customers tended to have lower 
amounts than other Income Support recipients.  For instance, only five per cent of 
Social Fund customers had savings of £500 or more, whereas 22 per cent of non-
customers had savings as large as that.  In fact, 15 per cent of those Income Support 
recipients who were not customers of the Social Fund in 2002 had savings of £1,000 
or more. 
 
Table 4.7 Current and savings accounts and saving 
 Column percentages
 Social Fund customer? Total 
 Yes No  
Respondent or partner has current or 
savings account 
 Yes 
   No 
 Unweighted base 
 
 
 
43 
57 
611 
 
 
60 
40 
699 
 
 
52 
48 
1310 
Number of savings accounts 
  Nil 
  1 
 2 
 3 
 Unweighted base 
 
 
83 
15 
2 
0 
611 
 
69 
26 
4 
1 
699 
 
76 
21 
3 
- 
1310 
Saves regularly 
 Yes 
 No 
 Unweighted base 
 
9 
91 
611 
 
16 
84 
699 
 
13 
87 
1310 
Base: Families on Income Support. 
 
In order to save, people need to have money over at the end of their benefit payment 
cycle.  FACS asked respondents how often they had money over at the end of the 
week.  In fact, very few Income Support recipients tended to have money over.  But 
Social Fund customers were more likely than other Income Support recipients to say 
that they never had money over (46 per cent compared with 38 per cent).  
Meanwhile, non-customers were slightly more likely to report that they sometimes 
had money over at the end of the week (Table 4.8). 
 
Although relatively few Income Support recipients said that they had money over at 
the end of the week, the majority of them had experience of running out of money 
before the end of the week (Table 4.8).  Social Fund customers were more likely than 
other Income Support recipients to report that they always ran out of money before 
the end of the week.  Thus a third (33 per cent) of customers said they always ran 
out of money, compared with one fifth (21 per cent) of Income Support recipients who 
were not customers of the Social Fund in 2002. 
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Table 4.8 Money at the end of the week 
 Column percentages
 Social Fund customer? Total 
 Yes No  
How often has money over at end of the 
week 
 Always 
 Most weeks/months 
 More often than not 
 Sometimes 
 Hardly ever 
 Never 
 Don’t know/too hard to say/varies too much 
 Unweighted base 
 
 
 
3 
4 
3 
17 
27 
46 
1 
611 
 
 
4 
5 
3 
24 
26 
38 
1 
697 
 
 
3 
5 
3 
20 
27 
42 
1 
1308 
How often runs out of money before the end 
of the week 
 Always 
 Most weeks/months 
 More often than not 
 Sometimes 
 Hardly ever 
 Never 
 Don’t know/too hard to say/varies too much 
 Unweighted base 
 
 
33 
19 
9 
24 
9 
6 
- 
611 
 
 
21 
14 
10 
29 
14 
12 
1 
697 
 
 
27 
17 
9 
26 
12 
9 
1 
1308 
Base: Families on Income Support. 
 
4.5 Debts 
 
Borrowing money and using shopping catalogues are common means by which 
people pay for expensive items.  Consequently, having financial debts is a ubiquitous 
feature of household finances.  The ability to manage those debts is critical to the 
success or otherwise of families’ ability to survive financially.  ‘Debts’ in this context 
refers to credit card and other borrowing debts, rent or mortgage arrears, and being 
behind on any other household bills.  
One in six (18 per cent) families in FACS 2002 had debts of one kind or another.  
However, Income Support recipients were significantly more likely to have debts than 
those who were not on Income Support: 50 per cent compared with 12 per cent 
respectively (Table 4.9).  Leaving aside their loan, Social Fund customers were more 
likely than other Income Support recipients to have debts (62 per cent compared with 
39 per cent).  
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Table 4.9  Debts 
Column percentages
Receives Income Support? Social Fund customer? Has debts? 
No Yes No Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Unweighted base 
 
12 
 
88 
 
6571 
 
50 
 
50 
 
1312 
 
39 
 
61 
 
699 
 
62 
 
38 
 
611 
Base: All families (cols 2 and 3); families on Income Support (cols 3 and 4) 
 
Social Fund customers were slightly more likely to have credit card or catalogue 
debts and more likely to have borrowing debts.  They were also more likely to be 
behind with their mortgage payments than other Income Support recipients.  
However, Social Fund customers were no more likely than non-customers to be 
behind with their rent (Table 4.10). 
 
Social Fund customers were more likely to be behind with other household bills, such 
as gas and electricity charges, council tax, and household insurance.  Thus, 58 per 
cent of customers of the Social Fund were behind with household bills (other than 
housing costs), compared with 34 per cent of non-customers.  Some 13 per cent of 
respondents who were Social Fund customers were behind with three or more 
household bills, but this was the case with only six per cent of other Income Support 
recipients (Table 4.10). 
 
The net result is that Social Fund customers in 2002 were both more likely to be in 
debt and tended to have more debts than other Income Support claimants who were 
not customers in that year.  Only 38 per cent of Social Fund customers, compared 
with 61 per cent of other Income Support recipients had no debts.  Or to put it the 
other way around, whereas 62 per cent of Social Fund customers had some debts, 
this was true of only 39 per cent of other people on Income Support.  Meanwhile, 18 
per cent of Social Fund customers had three or more debts, compared with only ten 
per cent of non-customers (Table 4.10). 
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Table 4.10 Debts 
Column percentages
 Social Fund customer? Total 
 Yes No  
Number of debts 
   None 
  One 
 Two 
 Three 
 Four 
  Five or more 
 Unweighted base 
 
38 
26 
18 
9 
4 
5 
611 
 
61 
18 
11 
7 
2 
1 
699 
 
50 
22 
14 
8 
3 
3 
1310 
Number of credit card or  
catalogue debts 
   None  
  One 
 Two 
 Unweighted base 
 
 
95 
5 
- 
611 
 
 
96 
4  
- 
699 
 
 
95 
5 
- 
1310 
Number of borrowing debts 
  None 
   One 
 Two 
 Three 
 Unweighted base 
 
89 
10 
1 
2 
611 
 
95 
5 
- 
0 
699 
 
92 
7 
1 
- 
1310 
Number of household bills 
respondent is behind with 
 None 
    One 
 Two 
  Three 
    Four 
    Five or more 
 Unweighted base 
 
 
42 
28 
18 
6 
4 
3 
611 
 
 
66 
18 
10 
4 
1 
1 
699 
 
 
55 
23 
14 
5 
3 
1 
1310 
Behind with rent 
   Up to date 
 Some arrears 
 Unweighted base 
 
75 
25 
139 
 
82 
19 
157 
 
78 
22 
296 
Behind with loan or mortgage 
repayments 
 Up to date 
 Some arrears 
 Unweighted base 
 
 
62 
39 
87 
 
 
[87] 
[13] 
16 
 
 
83 
17 
103 
Base: Families on Income Support. 
 
Social Fund customers who were behind on household bills, credit cards or loans 
owed a similar amount in total to other families on Income Support (Table 4.11).  
About half of both groups owed less than £250 and the remainder owed more than 
that amount. 
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Table 4.11 Total amount owed on household bills, credit cards and loans  
Column percentages
 Social Fund customer? Total 
 Yes No  
Total amount owing on household 
bills, credit cards and loans 
 £1 to £249 
      £250 to £499 
      £500 to £749 
 £750 to £999 
  £1,000 and over 
Unweighted base 
 
 
48 
19 
10 
5 
18 
362 
 
 
51 
19 
13 
7 
11 
249 
 
 
49 
19 
11 
6 
15 
611 
Base: Families on Income Support. 
 
In summary, Social Fund customers were more likely to run out of money at the end 
of the week, less likely to save, and more likely to be in debt than other people on 
Income Support.  The total amount they owed, however, was broadly the same. 
 
Social Fund customers were also more likely than other people on Income Support to 
have had trouble with debts that were hard to repay.  They were twice as likely as 
non-applicants to say that they had trouble with debts that were hard to repay ‘almost 
all of the time’.  And, conversely, they were only half as likely as other Income 
Support recipients to say that they ‘never’ had such trouble.  In total, a quarter (24 
per cent) Social Fund customers reported that they had trouble ‘almost all of the time’ 
with debts that were hard to repay (Table 4.14).  
 
Thus, a significant minority of people who had applied to the Social Fund or were 
repaying a Social Fund loan were finding it hard to repay the debts they owed.  
Although only a small minority (6 per cent) of Social Fund customers reported that 
they were ‘in deep financial trouble’, more did so than non-customers (2 per cent).  
However, the most common response amongst both groups to the question of how 
they were managing financially these days was that they ‘get by alright’ (46 per cent 
of Social Fund customers and 52 per cent of non-customers). 
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Table 4.12 Managing financially 
Column percentages
 Social Fund customer? Total 
 Yes No  
How often had trouble with debts that 
were hard to repay 
 Almost all the time 
  Quite often 
  Only sometimes 
   Never 
 Unweighted base 
 
 
 
24 
21 
37 
18 
633 
 
 
13 
12 
38 
37 
742 
 
 
18 
16 
37 
28 
1375 
How often worried about money during 
last few weeks 
  Almost all the time 
 Quite often 
 Only sometimes 
 Never 
 Unweighted base 
 
 
 
46 
21 
22 
11 
611 
 
 
34 
20 
30 
15 
697 
 
 
40 
21 
26 
13 
1308 
How is managing financially these days 
 Manage very well 
 Manage quite well 
 Get by alright 
 Don’t manage very well 
 Have some financial difficulties 
  Are in deep financial trouble 
 Unweighted base 
 
3 
18 
46 
10 
17 
6 
611 
 
6 
21 
52 
6 
12 
2 
697 
 
5 
19 
49 
8 
14 
4 
1308 
Base: Families on Income Support. 
 
Nevertheless, a majority of both customers and non-customers of the Social Fund in 
2001 worried about money ‘quite often’ or ‘almost all the time’.  In fact, when asked 
how often they had worried about money in the last few weeks, 46 per cent of Social 
Fund customers and 34 per cent of other Income Support recipients said they had 
worried ‘almost all of the time’.  A further 21 per cent and 20 per cent respectively 
reported that they had worried ‘quite often’ about money (Table 4.12). 
 
When asked how their financial situation had changed during the past six months, 
the most common response was that it had stayed the same.  This reply was given 
by 62 per cent of both Social Fund customers and other Income Support recipients 
(Table 4.13).  Broadly similar proportions of both groups said their situation had got 
worse.  And similar proportions said it had got better.  The impact of changes in 
financial and household circumstances will be explored in the next phase of this 
research project. 
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Table 4.13  Change in financial situation during the past six months 
Column percentages
 Social Fund customer? Total 
 Yes No  
How financial situation has changed 
during past 6 months 
 Got worse 
 Got better 
 Stayed the same 
 Unweighted base 
 
 
 
23 
16 
62 
611 
 
 
24 
14 
62 
695 
 
 
23 
15 
62 
1306 
Why financial situation has got worse 
   Need to buy more things 
 Managing on less money 
 Both the above 
  Rise in cost of living 
 Unweighted base 
 
 
44 
33 
19 
4 
135 
 
27 
49 
18 
6 
164 
 
35 
42 
19 
5 
299 
Why financial situation has got better 
  Need fewer things 
 More money 
 Both the above 
 Other reason 
 Unweighted base 
 
37 
32 
8 
22 
92 
 
36 
29 
9 
26 
102 
 
36 
30 
9 
24 
194 
Base: Families on Income Support. 
 
When asked why their situation had got worse, Social Fund customers were more 
likely to say it was because they needed to buy more things, while other Income 
Support recipients were more likely to say it was because they had to manage on 
less money than before (Table 4.13).  Thus, 44 per cent of the Social Fund 
customers who said their financial situation had deteriorated, said it was because 
they needed to buy more than before, while 33 per cent said it was because they 
were managing on less money.  By comparison, only 27 per cent of non-customers 
said their financial situation had deteriorated because they needed to buy more 
things, but 49 per cent said it was because they were managing on less money.  
Among those whose financial situation had improved over the past six months, there 
was no statistically significant difference between Income Support recipients who 
were Social Fund customers and those who were not.  Roughly similar proportions 
reported their situation had improved because they needed fewer things, because 
they had more money, or because of some other reason (Table 4.13). 
 
Finally, there was a significant relationship between the degree of financial hardship 
that Income Support recipients were experiencing and whether or not they were 
making use of Social Fund loans to get by.  (The design of the hardship measure is 
discussed in Chapter 6.)  Social Fund customers were significantly more likely to be 
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experiencing severe hardship than other Income Support recipients.  Conversely, 
they were less likely not to be experiencing hardship.  Thus, 35 per cent of Social 
Fund customers were estimated to be experiencing hardship in 2002, compared with 
25 per cent of non-customers.  Meanwhile, 20 per cent of customers were not 
experiencing hardship, compared with 34 per cent of other Income Support 
recipients. Roughly similar proportions were estimated to be in moderate hardship 
(Table 4.14).  
 
Table 4.14 Hardship 
Column percentages
 Social Fund customer? Total 
 Yes No  
No hardship 20 34 27 
Moderate hardship 45 41 43 
Severe hardship 35 25 30 
Unweighted base 542 618 1160 
Base: Families on Income Support. 
 
4.6 Repeat versus one-off loan applicants 
 
The final part of the chapter compares the characteristics and circumstances of 
repeat and one-off loan applicants.  For the purpose of this analysis, repeat 
applicants are families that applied for a Social Fund loan in at least two of the three 
years from 2000 to 2002.  One-off applicants are families that applied only once 
during this period.  The analysis refers to the characteristics of families in 2001, but 
of course families change over time.  Chapter 5 explores the association between 
Social Fund loan applications and changes in family circumstances between the 
different waves of the FACS survey. 
 
In fact, there were many similarities between these two groups of loan applicant.  In 
other words, there was relatively little to distinguish families that applied on just one 
occasion and those who applied two or three times over the three year period.  
However, there were some statistically significant differences between them, even if 
many of these were not very large.  Consequently, the focus here is on those 
characteristics and circumstances where there were statistically significant 
differences between these two groups.  
 
One important difference between repeat and one-off applicants is that the former 
were significantly more likely to be lone parents and less likely to be couples in 2001.  
For example, 15 per cent of repeat applicants were couples compared with 23 per 
cent of one-off applicants.  Repeat applicants also tended to have more children than 
one-off applicants (Table 4.15).   
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Table 4.15 Repeat vs. one-off loan applicants: characteristics 
 Column percentages
 Repeat applicant One-off applicant 
Relationship status   
 Lone parent 85 77 
 Couple 15 23 
 Unweighted base 332 307 
   
Number of dependent children   
 One 34 44 
 Two 40 31 
 Three or more 26 25 
 Unweighted base 332 307 
   
Housing tenure   
 Owner-occupier 2 11 
 Social tenant 81 80 
 Private tenant 17 8 
 Unweighted base 332 306 
Base: Families on Income Support that had applied for a loan. 
 
There were also significant differences in housing tenure between repeat and one-off 
applicants for Social Fund loans.  Similar proportions of each group were living in 
social rented housing in 2001: 81 per cent and 80 per cent respectively.  But repeat 
applicants included a very high proportion of private tenants and a relatively small 
proportion of owner-occupiers when compared with the one-off applicants.  Thus, 17 
per cent of repeat applicants were private tenants, compared with eight per cent of 
one-off applicants.  Only two per cent of repeat applicants were owner-occupiers 
compared with 11 per cent of families that had applied only once for a loan over this 
three year period (Table 4.15). 
 
There were also some significant differences in the financial situation of repeat and 
one-off applicants.  Repeat applicants were less likely than one-off applicants to have 
a current or savings account (43 per cent compared with 53 per cent respectively).  
We saw earlier in the chapter that one of the important differences between families 
on Income Support that were Social Fund customers and those that were not, was 
whether they had savings.  Families with savings were less likely to apply for a loan.  
The ability to save was also one of the factors on which repeat and one-off applicants 
differed.  Repeat applicants less often had money over at the end of the week, which 
implies that they had less scope to save money.  In fact, a smaller proportion of 
repeat applicants (8 per cent) than of one-off applicants (13 per cent) did indeed 
report that they saved regularly (Table 4.16). 
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Table 4.16 Repeat vs. one-off loan applicants: saving 
 Column percentages
 Repeat applicant One-off applicant 
Respondent or partner has 
current or savings account 
  
 Yes 43 53 
 No 57 47 
 Unweighted base 332 307 
   
Saves regularly   
 Yes 8 13 
 No 92 87 
 Unweighted base 332 307 
   
How often has money over at 
end of week 
  
 Always 3 3 
 Most weeks/months 3 7 
 More often than not 2 6 
 Sometimes 19 20 
 Hardly ever 35 29 
 Never 39 36 
 Unweighted base 331 305 
Base: Families on Income Support that had applied for a loan. 
 
Repeat loan applicants also reported more trouble with debts than those who applied 
only once in the three years from 2000 to 2002.  One-off applicants were significantly 
more likely than repeat applicants to say that they never had trouble with debts that 
were hard to repay.  A quarter (26 per cent) of one-off applicants said this, compared 
with only one in six (16 per cent) repeat applicants (Table 4.17).  However, the 
financial situation of repeat applicants was less likely to have changed over the 
previous six months than was the case for one-off applicants.  Sixty-three per cent of 
repeat applicants said their situation had stayed the same, compared with 51 per 
cent of families that had applied only once for a Social Fund loan.  Where it had 
changed, for repeat applicants it was more likely to have got worse (21 per cent) than 
to have got better (16 per cent), whereas for one-off applicants approximately equal 
proportions had got worse (24 per cent) or better (25 per cent). 
 
Finally, there was a higher degree of overall hardship among repeat applicants than 
among one-off applicants.  Thirty-seven per cent of repeat applicants were estimated 
to be experiencing severe hardship, compared with 28 per cent of one-off applicants.  
Whereas only 18 per cent of repeat applicants were experiencing no hardship, the 
same was true of 27 per cent of families that had applied only once for a loan over 
the three years (Table 4.17). 
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Table 4.17 Repeat vs. one-off loan applicants: financial situation 
 Column percentages
 Repeat applicant One-off applicant 
How often had trouble with debts 
that were hard to repay 
  
 Almost all the time 17 16 
 Quite often 24 21 
 Only sometimes 43 38 
 Never 16 26 
 Unweighted base 332 307 
   
How financial situation has 
changed during past six months 
  
 Got worse 21 24 
 Got better 16 25 
 Stayed the same 63 51 
 Unweighted base 332 307 
   
Hardship   
 No hardship 18 27 
 Moderate hardship 46 46 
 Severe hardship 37 28 
 Unweighted base 287 273 
Base: Families on Income Support that had applied for a loan. 
 
So far the extent to which repeat and one-off applicants differ has been examined 
using cross-tabulations, comparing one factor at a time.  However, these factors can 
be examined together and the influence of each factor estimated, independently of all 
other factors, using logistic regression.  As noted in Chapter 3, logistic regression is a 
multi-variate statistical technique that estimates the importance of each factor 
affecting the dependent variable, which in this case is whether a family is a repeat 
applicant or not.  This analysis found that the odds of a family being a repeat (as 
opposed to a one-off) applicant for a Social Fund were higher for families: - 
• headed by a lone parent 
• that never or hardly ever had money over at the end of the week/month 
• with no savings and two or more debts (Table A1, Appendix 2). 
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4.7 Conclusions 
 
Social Fund customers were in many respects significantly different from non-
customers in 2002.  Compared with other Income Support recipients, Social Fund 
customers were more likely to be lone parents, under 25, and tenants (especially 
social housing tenants).  These are all risk factors for being on Income Support.  The 
age of the youngest child in the family was also younger among Social Fund 
customers than among other Income Support recipients. 
 
In addition, Social Fund customers were less likely than non-customers to have 
money over at the end of the week, to have a current or savings account, and to 
have savings.  They were more likely to have debts, to have trouble repaying debts, 
to be in arrears on their mortgage, and to be behind with other household bills.  Not 
surprisingly, therefore, they were also more likely to have worried about money much 
of the time and to report having difficulty managing their finances.  Social Fund 
customers were also more likely to be experiencing hardship. 
 
Repeat applicants to the Social Fund shared many of the same characteristics as 
those who were one-off applicants over the three years from 2000 to 2002.  
However, there were some significant differences, which suggests they were not 
essentially the same types of family.  Compared with one-off applicants, repeat loan 
applicants were more likely to be lone parents, were less likely to have only one 
child, were more likely to be private tenants, were less likely to have a current or 
savings account, were less likely to save regularly, and were more likely to be 
experiencing financial hardship. 
 
 66
5 WHAT TRIGGERS A SOCIAL FUND LOAN APPLICATION? 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Previous studies that have investigated the reasons why families with children apply 
for the Social Fund have found a change in circumstances to be important (e.g. Huby 
and Dix, 1992; Cohen et al.,1996).  These studies, however, are qualitative in nature 
and little quantitative research has been undertaken on the reasons behind 
applications.  This chapter aims to fill this gap by looking at what events are 
associated with (trigger) an application for a Social Fund loan.  We will also consider 
how a change in circumstances affects lone parents compared to couple parents and 
those with savings compared to those without.  
 
5.2 Events potentially associated with Social Fund loan applications 
 
In this chapter, we consider sixteen events that may potentially trigger a Social Fund 
loan application.  These have been identified partly from the previous qualitative 
studies, partly through analysis of the characteristics of those applying for a Social 
Fund loan (see Chapter 4) and partly through apriori reasoning.  These events are 
not mutually exclusive - i.e. they can occur simultaneously.  For example, falling into 
debt can occur at the same time as having a baby, or a child could turn three at the 
same point as a house move.  Also, some events are overlapping - for example 
having a baby and an increase in the number of dependent children.  Our approach 
to this analysis draws upon the work of Jenkins and Rigg (2001) who analysed 
movements into and out of poverty. 
 
The events included in our analysis are: 
 
Child life stage events 
• Having a baby can instigate a need for new items such as clothes; a cot etc., 
especially if he/she is the first child.  
• A child reaching age 3 can instigate a need for new items because the child 
may need a bed (instead of a cot) or shoes as they become more independently 
mobile.  
• A child starting school instigates the need for a school uniform. 
• A child starting secondary school may instigate a need for a school uniform. 
• A child ending compulsory school education is a trigger depending upon the 
circumstances of the child. If the child moves into further education this will often 
be at a cost to their parents (i.e. greater hardship), and could also instigate the 
need for new items such as clothing. 
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Family change events 
• Separation (becoming a lone parent), potentially instigates a need for new 
lumpy items that previously may have been shared but also potentially leads to 
poverty with the move into a sole earner or workless household. 
• Partnering may bring with it an increase in the number of children in the 
household and thus lead to a redistribution of income and also an increased 
need for certain lumpy items.  
• An increase in the number of dependent children incorporates both having a 
baby and older children moving into the household.  Both could instigate a need 
for new items as well as a change in hardship status. 
• A decrease in the number of dependent children incorporates both children 
leaving the household but also the death of a child.  Whilst a child leaving the 
household, and indeed the death of a child in the long term, can lead to 
increased disposable income, the death of a child in the short term can lead to 
financial hardship.  
 
Housing events 
• Moving house may instigate a need for a variety of lumpy items, and items for 
decoration such as carpets etc.  
• Changing tenure may instigate a need for certain lumpy items but this depends 
on the type of tenure change – i.e. a move from furnished to unfurnished 
property will increase the need for lumpy items. 
 
Health events 
• An adult developing a limiting illness or disability brings with it a need for certain 
specific items to avoid discomfort.   
• A child developing (or being born with) a limiting illness or disability. 
• Decrease in the number of children with a limiting illness/disability can mean 
that a child has regained health (or at least no longer has a limiting 
illness/disability), which may decrease financial hardship but it can also mean 
that a child has died, which may, in the short term lead to greater financial 
hardship. 
 
Income events 
• Falling into debt (excluding deductions from Income Support for Social Fund 
loans) may trigger an application because the money used to pay off the debt is 
no longer available to buy certain lumpy items. 
• Becoming eligible to apply for a Social Fund loan.  Those families on Income 
Support for six months are eligible to apply for a Social Fund loan.  This variable 
enables us to investigate whether the fact that families are now eligible to apply 
triggers an application. 
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5.3 Assessing the importance of events as triggers: Methods 
 
In this chapter, we are concerned with the events that may be important for triggering 
a Social Fund loan application. Importance can be assessed in different ways.  In our 
analysis, we have adopted two different methods to analyse the association of each 
event with making a Social Fund loan application: 
• Method 1: What is a family’s chances of making (or not making) a Social Fund 
loan application if they experience a particular event? 
• Method 2: What proportion of all the Social Fund loan applications amongst 
families with children is attributable to particular events? 
 
5.3.1 Method 1 
 
The first method is focused on the individual.  It investigates the likelihood of a 
respondent making a Social Fund loan application if they experience a certain event.  
An event is important in this context if the associated probability of making a Social 
Fund loan application is relatively high.  It therefore looks at the importance of each 
event from the point of view of the individual ‘at risk’ of making a Social Fund loan 
application.  
 
We have used two statistics to investigate probability: bivariate analysis (rate) and 
logistic regression (odds).  The first is a more realistic statistic since it enables events 
to occur simultaneously, but it is limiting in the sense that it does not enable us to 
look at the importance of each event in isolation from other events.  An event is 
important if it is significant and the rate is high.  Logistic regression enables us to look 
at the odds of making a Social Fund loan for someone experiencing an event whilst 
holding all other events constant.  An event is important by this measure if it is 
significant and the odds are high.  We have presented both statistics in order to 
analyse the importance of events when they occur simultaneously with other events 
and also to assess the importance of each as a mutually exclusive trigger. 
 
5.3.2 Method 2 
 
The second method refers to the share of all Social Fund loan applications that is 
accounted for by each event.  An event is important if it accounts for a relatively high 
share of all Social Fund loan applications.  This method provides an aggregate 
perspective on the importance of each event. 
 
Both methods are important, but the second method incorporates both the first 
method – the probability of making a Social Fund loan application – and also the 
prevalence of an event for those on Income Support.  In other words, an event can 
account for a relatively high share of Social Fund loan applications if the event is 
relatively frequent, or if the chances of making a Social Fund loan application is 
relatively high among those experiencing the event.  We shall therefore look at 
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prevalence of each event in addition to each event as the proportion of all Social 
Fund applications.  
 
All analysis has been undertaken using the Families and Children Study (FACS).  We 
have investigated the association between an event occurring in one year with an 
application for a Social Fund loan in the subsequent year.  Due to small numbers for 
some events, we have pooled data in order to make analysis feasible.  This was 
undertaken by merging two datasets.  The first included triggers occurring between 
2000 and 2001, which were related to an application for a Social Fund loan in the 
second year (2001).  The second included triggers occurring between 2001 and 
2002, which were related to an application for a Social Fund loan in the second year 
(2002).  For each dataset, those interviewed in both the trigger and application year 
and those on Income Support in the application year were sampled.  The two data 
sets were then pooled and the analysis carried out.  The data was not weighted. 
Jenkins and Rigg (2001) similarly pooled ten years of data from the British 
Household Panel Survey to analyse poverty triggers. 
 
It would have been useful to undertake analysis looking at the association of an 
event occurring in one year with an application for a Social Fund loan in the same 
year.  However, it is not possible to ascertain from the FACS data precisely when 
during the year certain events occurred.  Consequently, it would not have been 
possible to know whether an application to the Social Fund occurred before or after 
the potential trigger event.  Hence, change could only be identified between one 
survey and the next. 
 
5.4 Trigger events for all Income Support recipients 
 
We first identified what events trigger an application among the overall population of 
Income Support recipients using bivariate analysis, as presented in Table 5.1.  The 
first column gives the prevalence - the percentage of all Income Support recipients 
experiencing the event.  The second column shows the rate (method 1, individual 
measure) - the percentage of all those experiencing the event who made a Social 
Fund loan application.  The third column shows the share (method 2; aggregate 
measure) - the proportion of all those making a Social Fund loan application 
experiencing an event.  
 
Events were only considered to be triggers if statistically significant.  We can see that 
there were three significant events, which triggered an application for a Social Fund 
loan.  These were:  
• a child reaching three years of age 
• a child reaching school age (5 years) 
• moving house. 
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The child stage life events were, as a group, the most important triggers for a Social 
Fund loan application.  Income events and health events were the least important - 
with neither being significant triggers. 
 
Moving house was associated with the largest share of Social Fund loan applications 
(21 per cent) in the following year.  Indeed, moving house is an event that triggers a 
felt need (Bradshaw, 1972) for a wide range and number of items.  The large share 
of applications was partly related to the prevalence of moving house - it was the 
event most likely to occur amongst Income Support recipients (16 per cent). 
However, the percentage of those moving house that made an application was 
significantly higher than the proportion of Income Support recipients who made an 
application (50 per cent compared to 38 per cent).  This demonstrates the 
importance of moving house as a trigger both at the aggregate and individual level. 
 
The fact that moving house was so frequent among Income Support recipients is 
perhaps surprising.  But moving house was significantly related to many different 
events: having a baby; a child turning three; a child starting school; a change in 
tenure; separating; partnering and becoming eligible for a Social Fund Loan.  
Frequent house moves are also related to living in social housing.  Keenan (1998) 
showed a neighbourhood effect whereby people in social housing moved several 
times a year as a result of neighbourhood decline and the associated anti-social 
behaviour. 
 
Having a child reaching three years of age or a child starting school in the household, 
were both important triggers, as demonstrated by the high share of Social Fund 
applications associated with these events (15 per cent and 12 per cent respectively).  
These events were both relatively prevalent and important at an individual level: 
nearly half of Income Support recipients who had experienced these events made an 
application for a Social Fund loan.   
 
It is perhaps surprising that having a baby was not a significant trigger.  We might 
expect that this event would trigger a need for a variety of one off lumpy items, such 
as a cot, but also to bring with it ongoing costs, such as nappies.  The insignificant 
result could be due to small numbers.  But it may be that people expecting a baby 
budget and plan more carefully than those experiencing other trigger events and thus 
avoid a need for a Social Fund application.  
 
A child ending compulsory education and a decrease in the number of children were 
both significant.  But a lower proportion than average experiencing these events 
made an application for a Social Fund loan (29 per cent and 28 per cent 
respectively).  In other words, experiencing these events was associated with a lower 
likelihood of making an application for a Social Fund loan.  These events overlap in 
that a child ending compulsory education automatically would result in a decrease in 
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the number of dependent children.  However, a decrease in the number of children 
could also indicate the death of a child.  
 
Table 5.1 The association between triggers and making a Social Fund loan 
Events 
 
Prevalence 
(% of all 
Income 
Support 
recipients 
experiencing 
event) 
Method 1: Rate 
(% of all Income 
Support 
recipients 
experiencing 
event making 
an application) 
Method 2: Share 
(% of all those 
making an 
application who 
have 
experienced an 
event) 
Significance 
(chi square) 
Child stage life events 
 New baby 6 40 6  
 Child reaching age 3 12 48 15 ** 
 Child starting school1 10 46 12 * 
 Child starting secondary 
education2 
11 34 9  
 Child ending compulsory 
education3 
8 29 6 ** 
Family change events 
 Increase in the number 
of dependent children 
9 35 8  
 Decrease in the number 
of dependent children 
11 28 8 ** 
 Partnering [2] [37] [2]  
 Separating  6 [37] [6]  
Housing events 
 Moving house 16 50 21 *** 
 Changing tenure 9 38 9  
Health events 
 Increase in the number 
of ill/disabled children 
6 42 6  
Decrease in the number 
of ill/disabled children 
6 45 6  
Respondent developing 
limiting illness/ disability  
8 41 9  
Income events 
 Becoming eligible for 
Social Fund 
7 [34] [6]  
 Falling into debt 12 39 12  
All Income Support 
recipients 
100 38 100  
Unweighted base 2108 807 807  
1Reaching age 5; 2 Reaching age 11; 3 Reaching age 16;  
Events that are statistically significant are indicated by one or more asterisks: *< 0.05; ** < 0.01; *** < 
0.001 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both trigger and application year and on Income Support in 
application year.  
 
From both the aggregate and individual perspective becoming eligible to apply for a 
Social Fund loan in the following year was not a significant trigger.  A lower 
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proportion (34 per cent) than average experiencing this event made an application.  
This suggests that either Income Support recipients wait before making an 
application, such as when their savings are depleted, or that they are not initially 
aware that they may be eligible for a loan.  
 
These trigger events can occur simultaneously; they are not mutually-exclusive.  
Biviarate analysis is realistic in the sense that it allows for events to occur 
simultaneously but it does not allow us to investigate the importance of each event as 
a trigger in isolation from other events.  We have used logistic regression to look at 
the odds of making a Social Fund loan whilst experiencing an event, holding all other 
events constant.   
 
Table A2 in Appendix 2 shows the most ‘parsimonious’ model.  Other events not 
included in the model were significant triggers but there was multi-collinearity (i.e. 
correlation) between certain variables, such as moving house and change in tenure.  
Therefore only one of these variables has been included in the model.  
 
Events that increased the odds of making a Social Fund loan application were: 
• Moving house: Families moving house were 70 per cent more likely to make an 
application compared to those who did not move house. 
• Child reaching three years of age: Families with a child reaching three years 
were 45 per cent more likely than those not having a baby to make a Social 
Fund loan application. 
• Child starting school (5 years)l: Families with a child starting school were 38 per 
cent more likely to make an application than those without a child starting 
school. 
 
Events that lowered the odds of making a Social Fund loan application were: 
• A decrease in the number of children: Families with a decrease in the number of 
children were 37 per cent less likely to make an application to a Social Fund 
loan. 
 
These results generally reflect the bivariate analysis, which suggests that these 
events are triggers both when occurring simultaneously with other events and when 
occurring in isolation. 
 
5.5 Trigger events for lone parents compared to couple parent families 
 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that lone parents were more likely than couple families to be 
Social Fund customers.  It is therefore important to investigate whether lone parents 
experience different and/or a greater number of triggers compared to couple parents.  
 
Table 5.2 shows the trigger events for lone parent families.  The following were 
significant triggers: 
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• child reaching three years of age 
• child starting school (5 years) 
• moving house. 
 
The triggers for lone parents reflect those for Income Support recipients as a whole. 
According to the aggregate measure, moving house was the most important trigger 
for lone parents, making up 21 per cent of all Social Fund loan applications.  
However, this was partly due to a high prevalence rate (17 per cent), but also a 
relatively high application rate (51 per cent).  
 
According to the aggregate measure, a child reaching three years of age and a child 
starting school (5 years) were important triggers (14 and 12 per cent respectively).  
Both events were important according to the individual measure (48 per cent of all 
lone parent Income Support recipients experiencing these events applied for a Social 
Fund loan).   
 
An increase in the number of ill/disabled children (47 per cent) appeared to be 
important according to the individual measure, but is not statistically significant.  This 
could be due to small numbers.  The application rate for this event was also higher 
compared to the whole population of Income Support recipients: 47 per cent of lone 
parents compared to 42 per cent of all Income Support recipients experiencing this 
event made an application for a Social Fund loan.  This indicates the vulnerability of 
lone parents: that a child developing or being both with a limiting illness/disability is 
more likely to push an already vulnerable lone parent into (further) hardship.  Indeed, 
a decrease in the number of children with a limiting illness/disability is likely to 
indicate the death of a child, rather than the child becoming well again, although this 
is not certain.  Previous research on the death of an ill/disabled child (Corden et al., 
2001) highlighted the financial hardship that these families face in the short term with 
loss of certain benefits and therefore a decrease in income available to pay for lumpy 
items. 
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Table 5.2 The association between triggers and making a Social Fund loan for lone 
parent families in any year 
Events 
 
Prevalence Applied 
for Social 
Fund loan 
Share of all 
Social Fund 
applications 
associated 
with event 
Significance
Child life stage events 
 New baby 6 [42] [6]  
 Child reaching age 3 12 48 14 * 
 Child starting school1 10 48 12 * 
 Child starting secondary school2 10 34 9  
 Child ending compulsory education3 7 33 6  
Family change events 
 Increase in dependent children 9 39 9  
 Decrease in dependent children 9 [31] [7] * 
 Separating  7 [37] [7]  
Housing events     
 Moving house 17 51 21 *** 
 Changing tenure 9 43 10  
Health events     
 Increase in the number of ill/disabled 
children 
5 [47] [6]  
 Decrease in the number of 
ill/disabled children 
5 [44] [6]  
 Respondent developing limiting 
illness/disability  
8 46 9  
Income events     
 Becoming eligible for Social Fund 7 [36] [6]  
 Falling into debt 13 40 12  
All lone parents on Income Support 100 41 100  
Unweighted base 1679 683 683  
1 Reaching age 5; 2 Reaching age 11; 3Reaching age 16 
Events that are statistically significant are indicated by one or more asterisks: *< 0.05; ** < 
0.01; *** < 0.001 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both trigger and application year and on Income Support in 
application year. 
 
For couple parents, the numbers making a Social Fund loan application were very 
small and therefore the analysis must be treated with caution.  Table 5.3 
demonstrates that the only significant trigger was: 
• A child reaching three years of age. 
 
If a child had reached three years of age, this was likely to trigger a Social Fund loan 
application in the following year.  According to the aggregate measure, 19 per cent of 
all Social Fund loan applications made by couples were related to a child reaching 
three years of age.  Indeed, this event was important at the individual level (46 per 
cent) - a high proportion of couples experiencing the event made an application.   
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Generally, the bivariate analysis suggested that for couple parents more than for lone 
parents, a change in circumstances was less likely to trigger a Social Fund loan 
application.  
 
Table 5.3 The association between triggers and making a Social Fund loan for 
couple parent families in any year 
Events 
 
Prevalence Applied 
for Social 
Fund loan 
Share of all Social 
Fund applications 
associated with 
event 
Significance 
Child life stage events 
 New baby [6] [29] [6]  
 Child reaching age 3 [13] [46] [19] * 
 Child starting school1 [12] [37] [15]  
 Child starting secondary school2 [13] [32] [14]  
 Child ending compulsory 
education3 
[13] [19] [8]  
Family change events 
 Increase in dependent children [12] [21] [8]  
 Decrease in dependent children 17 [23] [13]  
 Partnering [14] [37] [16]  
Housing events 
 Moving house 15 [42] [20]  
 Changing tenure [10] [19] [6]  
Health events 
 Increase in the number of 
ill/disabled children 
[11] [30] [10]  
 Decrease in the number of 
ill/disabled children 
[6] [48] [9]  
 Respondent developing limiting 
illness/ disability 
[9] [24] [7]  
Income events 
 Becoming eligible for Social Fund [8] [30] [8]  
 Falling into debt [12] [35] [14]  
All couple parents on Income 
Support 
100 31 100  
Unweighted base 361 110 110  
1 Reaching age 5; 2 Reaching age 11; 3Reaching age 16 
Events that are statistically significant are indicated by one or more asterisks: *< 0.05; ** < 
0.01; *** < 0.001 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both trigger and application year and on Income Support in 
application year. 
 
Using logistic regression to look at each event whilst controlling for all other events, 
we can see that there was some overlap in the kinds of events that triggered a Social 
Fund loan application for lone parents compared to couples (see Tables A3 and A4 
in Appendix 2).  
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Events that increased the odds of an application: 
• Moving house: This was a trigger for lone parents but not for couple parents.  
Lone parents moving house were 64 per cent more likely to make an application 
compared to those who did not moving house.   
• A child reaching three years of age: Couple families with a child reaching three 
years were over twice as likely as those without a child reaching this age to 
make an application.  
 
For both lone parents and couples, a child reaching three years of age was 
significantly associated with moving house, although this association was stronger for 
couples than for lone parents.  Whilst a child reaching three years of age is likely to 
spark the need for some lumpy items, moving house is likely to generate a need for a 
wide variety of lumpy items.  Therefore, these two events occurring simultaneously 
were more likely to generate an application for a Social Fund loan. 
 
Events that decreased the odds of an application: 
• A decrease in dependent children: Lone parents with a child starting secondary 
school were 37 per cent less likely to make an application than those without a 
child starting school. However, this was not significant for couple families. 
 
 5.6 Families without savings compared to those with savings 
 
Income Support recipients with savings may be protected from hardship, and thus a 
need for a Social Fund loan application, since they are able to fall back on their 
savings in times of need.  Those without, however, will have no such personal safety 
net if a need arises.  We have seen in Chapter 4 that Income Support recipients with 
savings are less likely to make an application for a Social Fund loan than those 
without.  It is therefore useful to know whether certain events trigger an application 
for those without savings more readily than for those with savings.  
 
Table 5.4 shows the triggers for those without savings.  These were:  
• child reaching three years of age  
• child starting school (5 years) 
• moving house. 
 
These are almost the same as the triggers for the whole population of Income 
Support recipients.  But, compared to all Income Support recipients, the triggers were 
more important for individuals without savings; a higher proportion of those who 
experienced these events made a Social Fund loan application.  Fifty-three per cent 
of Income Support recipients without savings made an application if a child reached 
three years of age; a child started school or they moved house compared to 42 per 
cent of all Income Support recipients.   
 
 77
Table 5.4 The association between triggers and making a Social Fund loan for 
families with no savings in any year 
Events 
 
Prevalence Applied for 
Social Fund 
loan 
Share of all 
Social Fund 
applications 
associated with 
event 
significance
Child life stage events 
 New baby 7 [41] [6]  
 Child reaching age 3 13 53 15 ** 
 Child starting school1 10 53 12 * 
 Child starting secondary school2 11 37 9  
 Child ending compulsory 
education3 
8 [33] [6] * 
Family change events 
 Increase in dependent children 10 37 9  
 Decrease in dependent children 12 32 9 ** 
 Partnering [3] [46] [3]  
 Separating  6 [38] [6]  
Housing events 
 Moving house 17 53 21 *** 
 Changing tenure 9 41 9  
Health events 
 Increase in the number of 
ill/disabled children 
6 [46] [6]  
 Decrease in the number of 
ill/disabled children 
5 [51] [6]  
 Respondent developing limiting 
illness/ disability 
8 48 9  
Income events 
 Becoming eligible for Social Fund 7 [36] [6]  
 Falling into debt 12 42 12  
Income Support recipients 
without savings 
100 43 100  
Unweighted base 1587 686 686  
1 Reaching age 5; 2 Reaching age 11; 3Reaching age 16 
Events that are statistically significant are indicated by one or more asterisks: * < 0.05; ** < 0.01; *** < 
0.001 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both trigger and application year and on Income Support in 
application year. 
 
The numbers applying for a Social Fund loan with savings were very small and 
therefore the analysis must be treated with caution.  With that qualification in mind, 
Table 5.5 shows that for Income Support recipients with savings there was only one 
significant trigger: 
• Moving house. 
According to the aggregate measure, this trigger was important - a fifth of all Social 
Fund applications by Income Support recipients with savings were attributed to this 
event.  This was partly due to a relatively high prevalence (13 per cent) but also a 
high application rate: according to the individual measure, 38 per cent of all those 
who experienced this event made an application.  Indeed, this is compared to 53 per 
 78
cent of those without savings who experienced this event and 50 per cent of all 
Income Support recipients.  So, moving house was a trigger for recipients with 
savings but it was a relatively unimportant one compared to those without savings.  
 
Table 5.5 The association between triggers and making a Social Fund loan for 
families with savings in any year 
Triggers  
 
Prevalence Applied 
for Social 
Fund loan 
Share of all 
Social Fund 
applications 
associated 
with event 
Significance
Child life stage events 
 New baby [4] [35] [6]  
 Child reaching age 3 10 [28] [12]  
 Child starting school1 11 [26] [12]  
 Child starting secondary school2 11 [22] [10]  
 Child ending compulsory education3 [8] [16] [6]  
Family change events 
 Increase in dependent children [7] [26] [7]  
 Decrease in dependent children [9] [12] [5]  
 Partnering [2] [0] [0]  
 Separating  [5] [32] [7]  
Housing events 
 Moving house 13 [35] [20] * 
 Changing tenure [9] [29] [12]  
Health events 
 Increase in the number of ill/disabled 
children 
[6] [29] [8]  
 Decrease in the number of 
ill/disabled children 
[6] [28] [7]  
 Respondent developing limiting 
illness/ disability 
[9] [22] [8]  
Income events 
 Becoming eligible for Social Fund [6] [24] [6]  
 Falling into debt 12 [28] [15]  
Income Support recipients with 
savings 
100 23 100  
Unweighted base 521 121 121  
1 Reaching age 5; 2 Reaching age 11; 3Reaching age 16 
Events that are statistically significant are indicated by one or more asterisks: *< 0.05; ** < 0.01; *** < 
0.001  
Base: Respondents interviewed in both trigger and application year and on IS in application year. 
 
Those with savings experienced the same events as those without savings (to a 
lesser or greater degree).  However, it appears that those with savings were buffered 
from the negative effects of these events.  As a result, fewer events triggered a 
Social Fund loan application compared to those without savings. 
Looking at these events in isolation from other events using logistic regression 
analysis (see Tables A5 and A6 in Appendix 2 for the models) shows that those 
without savings experienced a greater number of triggers than those with savings: 
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• A child starting school: Families without savings with a child starting school were 
50 per cent more likely than those without a child starting school. 
• Moving house: Families without savings who moved house were 61 per cent 
more likely than those who did not move house to make a Social Fund loan 
application.  However, families with savings who moved house were 95 per cent 
more likely than those who did not move house to make a Social Fund loan 
application.  This was the only trigger for those with savings.  
• A child reaching three years of age: Families without savings were 46 per cent 
more likely to make a Social Fund loan application if they had a child in the 
household reaching three years of age compared to those who didn’t.  
 
Events that decreased the odds of an application: 
• A decrease in dependent children: Families without savings with a decrease in 
the number of dependent children were 41 per cent less likely to make an 
application than those without a decrease. 
• A increase in dependent children: However, families without savings were also 
32 per cent less likely to make an application if they experienced an increase 
in the number of dependent children compared to those who did not.  
 
5.7 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have used two methods to investigate what triggers an application 
for a Social Fund loan.  We have seen that whilst there are similarities between 
method 1 (the individual measure) and method 2 (the aggregate measure), we need 
to take prevalence into account when assessing the importance of each event.  An 
event may be important on an individual level, even if a small proportion experience 
the event.  Also, an event may not be important at the individual level, but because it 
is relatively prevalent it may make up a high proportion of Social Fund loan 
applications.   
 
Having said this, we have found that there are a number of significant events that 
trigger a Social Fund loan application for the overall population of Income Support 
recipients: a child reaching three years of age, a child starting school, and moving 
house.  These events bring with them specific felt needs that may spark an 
application for a Social Fund loan.  It is perhaps surprising that having a baby does 
not trigger an application, but nevertheless the analysis shows that the (felt) need for 
lumpy items arises as children experience certain life events such as reaching school 
age. 
 
We have also seen that couple parents and families with savings on Income Support 
are to some extent protected from the negative affects of certain events.  As a result, 
couple parents compared to lone parents, and families with savings compared to 
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those without, are less likely to make an application for a Social Fund loan and fewer 
events act as triggers for these two groups. 
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6 SOCIAL FUND LOANS AND HARDSHIP AND DEPRIVATION 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter considers the outcome of repaying a Social Fund loan and, in particular, 
whether it is associated with change in the level of hardship.  On the one hand 
repaying a Social Fund loan decreases income and therefore may lead to increased 
hardship, especially because those repaying the loan already have a low income.  
On the other hand, those with a Social Fund loan have access to an interest free 
loan, whereas those without one might be driven towards high interest alternatives 
and thus fall (deeper) into hardship as a result.  Obviously repaying a Social Fund 
loan is only one potential contributor to change in hardship between one year and the 
next; hence other factors might be important in causing such change.  But to 
investigate these other factors is beyond the scope of this research.  We investigate 
the association between repaying a Social Fund loan in one year and any 
subsequent change in hardship and deprivation the following year, comparing those 
repaying a Social Fund loan with those not repaying a loan. 
 
6.2 Measuring hardship 
 
The measurement of hardship and deprivation is arbitrary and various methods have 
been adopted in previous studies: relative income measures; absolute income 
methods; socially defined measures etc.  None can be considered to be a right or 
wrong measure. In this report we use an index to summarise hardship, which has 
been used in previous studies analysing the Families and Children Study (FACS).  
The index includes a mixture of both absolute (e.g. not being able to afford heating) 
and more relative measures, which have been changed and developed over the 
survey years.  For continuity, we have employed the same index and thresholds as 
used in 2002 by the Policy Studies Institute (Vegeris and Perry, 2003), which uses 
nine indicators to measure both social and financial hardship.  These are: 
• Worries about money almost all the time and runs out of money most weeks. 
• Has no bank account and has two or more debts. 
• Reports two or more problems with accommodation and is unable to afford 
repairs if a homeowner. 
• Lived in overcrowded accommodation. 
• Cannot afford to keep home warm. 
• Has a relative material deprivation score on food items in the highest 7.5 per 
cent. 
• Has a relative material deprivation score on clothing items in the highest 7.5 per 
cent. 
• Has a relative material deprivation score on consumer durables in the highest 
7.5 per cent. 
 82
• Has relative material deprivation score on leisure activities in the highest 7.5 per 
cent. 
 
The one difference from the Policy Studies Institute measure is that we have 
necessarily excluded having a Social Fund loan as one of the debts that count 
towards the hardship score.  We consider each indicator separately under three 
general areas of hardship - family finances (including debts and savings), housing 
conditions and relative material deprivation.  We explore whether repaying a Social 
Fund loan in one year is associated with change in hardship over the following year.  
The above indicators are used to measure this, but also some additional indicators 
are included.  In the final section, the indicators from each area are combined to 
create an index of overall hardship.  We then explore the association between 
repaying a Social Fund loan and change in the overall hardship measure. 
 
All analysis has been undertaken using the FACS survey.  We have investigated the 
association between repaying a Social Fund loan in one year with change in 
hardship/deprivation between that year and the subsequent year.  Due to small 
numbers, to make analysis feasible we have pooled data.  This was undertaken by 
putting together two datasets.  The first included hardship/deprivation change 
between 2000 and 2001, which was related to repaying a Social Fund loan in the first 
year (2000).  The second included hardship/deprivation change between 2001 and 
2002, which was related to repaying a Social Fund loan in the first year (2001).  For 
each data set, those interviewed in both years were sampled and, in order to ensure 
that a move into employment was not the reason for a change in hardship or 
deprivation level, respondents also had to be on Income Support in both years.  The 
two data sets were then pooled and the analysis carried out.  Because the data for 
three years was pooled in this way, it was analysed without weights.  
 
6.3 Family finances 
 
Managing finances requires families to balance income with expenditure.  Families 
repaying a Social Fund loan may find it more difficult to do this compared to those not 
repaying a Social Fund loan since they have to balance repaying a debt with 
everyday expenses and savings.  However, since the loan is interest free, they may 
be able to manage their finances better than those with other types of loans or if they 
had no help at all.  Also, the fact that the loan repayment is deducted directly from 
their Income Support payment may enable them to better manage their finances.  But 
managing debt is a balancing act, and if repaying a Social Fund loan negatively 
affects a family’s ability to save or increases their levels of debt, this could lead to 
(greater) hardship. 
 
We examined whether there was any relationship between change in family finances 
and repaying a Social Fund loan.  If a Social Fund loan was being paid, we 
investigated change in hardship over the next year.  We explored both respondents’ 
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self reported change in financial circumstances as well as change in savings and 
debts. 
 
6.3.1 How does repaying a loan relate to families’ ability to manage 
financially? 
 
Respondents were asked whether they considered themselves to be managing 
financially.  This subjective measure was not included in the hardship index but is 
useful since it captures how a family is coping financially, or at least how they feel 
they are coping.  We can see from Table 6.1 that those repaying a Social Fund loan 
differed significantly from those not repaying a Social Fund loan in terms of changes 
in whether they felt they were managing or not.  Those repaying a Social Fund loan 
were more likely to report a change (36 per cent) compared to those not repaying a 
Social Fund loan (29 per cent), and the direction of change was most likely to be 
from feeling that they were not managing in the year they were repaying the Social 
Fund loan to feeling that they were managing (27 per cent) in the year after.  In other 
words, those repaying a Social Fund loan were more likely to feel that their situation 
had got better compared to those not repaying a Social Fund loan. 
 
Table 6.1 Change in financial position by whether repaying a loan in the previous 
year 
     Column percentages 
Change Not repaying a loan Repaying a loan 
  
 Not managing to managing  23 27 
 Managing1 to not managing2  [6] [9] 
 No change 71 64 
 Unweighted base 661 432 
1 Managing - manage very well/manage quite well/get by alright. 
2 Not managing - don't manage very well/have some financial difficulties/are in deep financial 
trouble. 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both years analysed and on IS in both years. 
 
6.3.2 How does repaying a loan relate to families’ ability to save? 
 
A summary indicator is used in the hardship index to measure ability to save, by 
combining whether they worry about money almost all the time and whether they run 
out of money most weeks.  This measure assumes that a family’s ability to save 
depends upon whether they have money left at the end of the week, but also upon 
whether they worry about money, which could affect whether they do actually save. 
We explored the relationship between repaying a Social Fund loan and change in 
this summary measure. 
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Table 6.2 shows evidence that there is a relationship between repaying a Social 
Fund loan and a change in a family’s ability to save, according to the summary 
measure.  For those repaying a loan, the analysis indicates that repaying a loan was 
more likely to have a positive impact than a negative one - 13 per cent of those 
repaying a loan shifted from always running out of and worrying about money to 
having money left at the end of the week and not worrying about money in the year 
following the loan repayment, compared to 10 per cent who shifted from having 
money left at the end of the week and not worrying about money to always running 
out of and worrying about money the following year. 
 
Table 6.2 Ability to save by whether repaying a loan in the previous year 
               Column percentages 
Change Not repaying a Social 
Fund loan 
Repaying a Social 
Fund loan 
  
 Runs out/worries to doesn’t worry/run 
out 9 13 
 Doesn’t worry/run out to runs 
out/worries 9 10 
 No change 83 77 
 Unweighted base 1084 725 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both years analysed and on IS in both years. 
 
But to find out whether respondents do actually save, they were asked whether they 
had savings accounts and whether they saved regularly.  These measures did not 
indicate how much savings a family had but whether a family saved at all - whether it 
be formally in a savings account or not.  We looked at whether a change in saving or 
not was associated with repaying a Social Fund loan.  
 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show that, for both measures, those repaying a Social Fund loan 
were significantly less likely to experience a change in their ability to save compared 
to those not repaying a Social Fund loan.  Of those repaying a loan, 17 per cent had 
reported a change in whether they had savings accounts compared to 26 per cent of 
those not repaying a loan.  In terms of saving regularly, 12 per cent of those repaying 
a loan had reported a change in whether they saved regularly compared to 16 per 
cent of those not repaying a Social Fund loan.  In other words, those repaying a 
Social Fund loan were less likely to be associated with a change in saving behaviour 
compared to those not repaying a Social Fund loan.  But for those who did 
experience a change in saving behaviour, there was some indication that this change 
was more likely to be positive rather than negative.  Those repaying a Social Fund 
loan were more likely to move from not having a savings account to having a savings 
account in the following year (10 per cent) than vice versa (7 per cent).  Therefore 
generally - according to this measure and, and also the summary indicator above 
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which measured ability to save - those repaying a loan were more likely to move into 
a position where they were better able to save than vice versa. 
 
Table 6.3  Change in whether has a savings account by whether repaying a Social 
Fund loan  
                          Column percentages 
Change Not repaying a Social Fund 
loan 
Repaying a Social Fund 
loan 
  
 No to yes  14 10 
 Yes to no  12 7 
 No change 74 83 
 Unweighted base 1084 725 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both years analysed and on IS in both years. 
 
Table 6.4 Change in whether saves regularly by whether repaying a Social Fund 
loan 
     Column percentages 
 Not repaying a Social Fund 
loan 
Repaying a Social Fund 
loan 
  
 No to yes  9 [7] 
 Yes to no  8 [5] 
 No change 84 88 
 Unweighted base 1084 725 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both years analysed and on IS in both years. 
 
6.3.3 How does repaying a loan relate to whether a family is in debt? 
 
Families on low income can maintain a level of material comfort by incurring debt.  
But increasing debt can itself lead to hardship if the repayments are high.  Pre-1999 
evidence demonstrates that, in order to pay back the Social Fund loan, many people 
get further into debt (e.g. Huby and Dix, 1992).  In theory, the Social Fund loan itself 
could be used as a deposit for a larger interest-bearing loan or, on the other hand, to 
pay off an interest bearing debt.  This section aims to compare the level of debt for 
those repaying a Social Fund loan compared to those not repaying a Social Fund 
loan. 
 
In terms of moving in or out of debt there is no significant difference between those 
repaying a Social Fund loan and those not repaying a loan.  In other words, repaying 
a Social Fund loan is not associated with falling into or climbing out of debt.  
However, Table 6.5 shows that recipients were significantly more likely to experience 
a change in the number of debts compared to those not repaying a Social Fund loan.  
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This change is more likely to be associated with becoming less indebted rather than 
falling further into debt.  One explanation for this is that they were using the interest 
free Social Fund loan to pay off another debt - perhaps an interest bearing debt.    
 
Table 6.5 Change in number of debts by whether repaying a Social Fund loan  
     Column percentages 
Change Not repaying a Social 
Fund loan 
Repaying a Social 
Fund loan 
  
 Three or more debts to less than 
three  9 14 
 Less than three to three or more 
debts 6 10 
 No change  85 76 
 Unweighted base 1084 725 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both years analysed and on IS in both years. 
 
The analysis also indicates an association between repaying a Social Fund loan and 
a change in credit card/ catalogue debts (Table 6.6).  Those repaying a loan were 
more likely to experience a change compared to those not repaying a loan, although 
the direction of this change was mixed.  
 
The analysis did not indicate any significant association between repaying a Social 
Fund loan and a change in other types of debt, such as housing arrears etc.   
 
Table 6.6 Change in number of credit card/ catalogue debts by whether repaying a 
Social Fund loan  
      Column percentages 
Change Not repaying a Social 
Fund loan 
Repaying a Social 
Fund loan 
  
 Debts to no debts  [4] [4] 
 No debts to debts [3] [6] 
 No change  93 90 
Unweighted base 1084 725 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both years analysed and on IS in both years. 
 
6.3.4 How does repaying a loan relate to change in debts and savings? 
 
The hardship index uses a summary indicator for debts and savings, defining people 
as being in hardship if they have no bank account and two or more debts.  In this 
section we look at the association between repaying a Social Fund loan and the 
change in this summary measure. 
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Table 6.7 shows that there was a significant difference between those repaying and 
those not repaying a Social Fund loan in terms of change in hardship by this debt 
and savings summary measure.  Those repaying a loan were significantly more likely 
to have experienced a change in hardship by this measure, and this change was 
most likely to be moving out of hardship: just under one-fifth of those repaying a loan 
had moved out of hardship compared to just over one in ten who had moved into 
hardship.  This indicates that those repaying a Social Fund loan found it easier to 
both climb out of debt and at the same time to save, perhaps because they did not 
have to pay interest on the Social Fund loan they had.  
 
Table 6.7 Change in debts and savings by whether repaying a Social Fund loan 
     Column percentages 
Change Not repaying a loan 
 
Repaying a loan 
 
  
 No bank account +2 or more debts to bank 
account +less than 2 debts  11 19 
 Bank account +less than 2 debts to no bank 
+2 or more debts  9 12 
 No change  80 68 
 Unweighted base 1084 725 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both years analysed and on IS in both years. 
 
6.4 How does repaying a loan relate to a family’s housing conditions? 
 
Next, we consider the relationship between repaying a loan and housing conditions. 
Several variables have been included in the hardship index to investigate housing 
quality.  These are: reporting two or more housing problems and cannot afford to 
repair house if house owner; cannot afford to keep house warm and in overcrowded 
accommodation.  Repaying a Social Fund loan may be related to increased hardship 
in these areas.  But repaying a Social Fund loan may improve a familiy’s position 
since they may have been able to use the Social Fund loan to pay for these things - 
or to pay off an interest bearing debt and free up more income which can be used to 
improve housing conditions.   
 
The analysis indicates that repaying a loan was significantly associated with a 
change in being able to keep the house warm (Table 6.8), and this change was in the 
direction of less hardship - from not being able to afford to keep the house warm to 
being able to afford to keep it warm.  But according to the other two housing 
measures, repaying a loan was not significantly associated with a change in housing 
problems.  This could be associated with a shortfall in the housing measure, which 
largely focuses on problems with accommodation such as ‘windows need replacing’ 
or ‘rising damp’ that is the owner’s responsibility.  And, since a high proportion of our 
sample were in social housing, these problems would not have been their 
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responsibility.  Therefore, these indicators were not necessarily suitable as a 
measure of deprivation.  Likewise, living in overcrowded accommodation would be 
beyond the control of those in social housing who would have to wait to be re-housed 
in more suitable accommodation.  
 
Table 6.8 Change in being able to afford to keep house warm by whether repaying 
a Social Fund loan 
      Column percentages 
Change Not repaying a loan 
 
Repaying a loan 
 
  
 Can’t afford to Can afford  6 10 
 Can afford to Can’t afford 5 [5] 
 No change  89 85 
 Unweighted base 1084 725 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both years analysed and on IS in both years. 
 
6.5 Material deprivation 
 
A family’s ability to afford certain items is a measure of their material deprivation.  
Families may have resolved a need in one area via the Social Fund loan.  However, 
previous research demonstrates that, in order to pay back a Social Fund loan, many 
people go without essential items, or buy second hand items that are more liable to 
break down than non users (Huby and Dix, 1992; Kempson et al., 2002).  This 
section considers whether those repaying a Social Fund loan, compared to those 
without a Social Fund loan, are materially deprived - and going without certain items - 
or whether those without a Social Fund loan are actually worse off in this respect.  
 
In the FACS survey, respondents were asked 34 questions about individual items or 
activities relating to the four dimensions of expenditure: food; clothing; consumer 
durables and leisure activities.  They had to indicate whether they possessed the 
item/took part in the activity, and if not, whether this was because they did not want 
or need the item or because they could not afford it.  A family is considered to be 
deprived of an item or activity if they would like to have it, but cannot afford it at the 
moment.  This combines both a desire to have an item and its affordability.  
 
We have used the Relative Material Deprivation Score (RMDS) to identify those 
families who are worse off relative to their cohort.  This uses ‘prevalence weighting’ 
which enables us to account for the value of items by assigning weights based on the 
proportion of the population that already owns such items.  This method of measuring 
deprivation does not take into account the items that are considered to be socially 
perceived necessities, like other surveys - such as the Poverty and Social Exclusion 
Survey (PSE) - have done.  The PSE method uses value judgements about which 
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items are necessities, and therefore which should contribute more to poverty (see 
Gordon et al., 2000).  The RMDS or prevalence method is based on population 
consumption and assumes that it is more serious, or that people are more needy, if 
they go without items consumed by the majority of the population, such as a 
telephone, rather than less frequently found items, such as a dishwasher (Vegeris 
and Perry, 2003).   
 
In ‘prevalence weighting’ each respondent who could not afford an item is given a 
score equivalent to the percentage of cross-section families who owned the item.  So 
the families who could not afford a commonly owned item, such as a telephone, 
score more highly compared to those who could not afford a less commonly owned 
item, such as a dishwasher.  The weighted value for each item are then summed for 
each family.  Therefore if a family lacked all items they would score 100, the 
maximum score.  If they had all of the items (or said that they did not need/want the 
item) they would score zero, the minimum score.  Therefore the higher the score, the 
higher the level of deprivation (Vegeris and Perry, 2003).  
 
In order to be able to undertake comparison across the survey years, the prevalence 
weightings assigned to families who could not afford an item were maintained at the 
2001 cross-section levels.  In other words, when calculating the 2001 RMDS, items 
that families could not afford were weighted by the percentage of families in 2001 
who had the item.  This was then applied to the 2000 data and the 2002 data.  We 
used 2001 rather than 2000 or 2002 as the base in order to enable our data to be 
compared with the other studies  -based on the FACS survey- that have used this 
measure (e.g. Vegeris and Perry, 2003).  
 
For the deprivation index, a judgement had to be made about where to set the 
threshold to distinguish the most deprived families.  For the 1999 and 2000 cohort, 
the cut-off point was the poorest 20 per cent of families on the RMDS distribution.  
But in 2002, the threshold was shifted to the top 7.5 per cent in the distributions in 
order to account for the broader range of incomes represented in the sample 
population (Vegeris and Perry, 2003).  We used the latter. 
 
We considered four types of item: food; clothing; consumer durables and leisure 
activities as well as overall deprivation.  
 
 
6.5.1 Food 
 
People were asked whether they wanted and could afford the following food items: 
cooked main food everyday; fresh fruit on most days; fresh vegetables most days; 
meat/fish every other day; roast joint every week; cakes/biscuits on most days; brand 
named food on most days.  These were combined into a single relative deprivation 
index of food.  
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Repaying a Social Fund loan was not significantly associated with the level of 
deprivation in terms of food.   
 
6.5.2 Clothing 
 
People were asked whether they wanted and could afford the following items of 
clothing: a weatherproof coat for each adult; weatherproof coat for each child; two 
pairs of weatherproof shoes for each adult; two pairs of weatherproof shoes for each 
child; new, not second hand clothes when needed; best outfit for children; brand 
name clothes or shoes for children.  These were combined into a single clothing 
deprivation index.  This analysis (Table 6.9) showed that repaying a loan was 
significantly associated with a change in clothing deprivation status: 28 per cent of 
those repaying a loan experienced a change in clothing deprivation status compared 
to 21 per cent of those not repaying a loan.  This change was more likely to be a 
move into deprivation - 16 per cent moved into the poorest 7.5 per cent of families on 
the RMDS distribution compared to 12 per cent who moved out of the poorest 7.5 per 
cent. 
 
Table 6.9 Consumer durables deprivation by whether repaying a Social Fund loan  
  Column percentages 
Change Not repaying a loan Repaying a loan 
  
 Moved into highest 7.5% 12 16 
 Moved out of highest 7.5% 10 12 
 No change 79 72 
 Unweighted base 1084 725 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both years analysed and on IS in both years. 
 
6.5.3 Consumer durables 
 
People were asked whether they wanted and could afford the following consumer 
durables: colour television; cable/satellite/digital television; video recorder; music 
system; home computer; telephone; refrigerator; deep freeze; washing machine; 
tumble drier; dishwasher; microwave oven; car or van and central heating.  Again, 
these were combined into a single index of consumer durable deprivation.  
 
Table 6.10 shows significant differences in terms of change in consumer durable 
deprivation between those in receipt of a Social Fund loan compared with those not 
in receipt.  Those repaying a Social Fund loan (26 per cent) were significantly more 
likely than those not repaying a Social Fund loan (21 per cent) to have experienced 
change in terms of the consumer durables deprivation score.  However, for those 
repaying a Social Fund loan, the direction of this change is inconclusive. 
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Table 6.10 Clothing deprivation by whether repaying a Social Fund loan 
 Column percentages 
Change Not repaying a loan Repaying a loan 
  
 Moved into highest 7.5% 13 14 
 Moved out of highest 7.5% 9 12 
 No change 79 74 
 Unweighted base 1084 725 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both years analysed and on IS in both years. 
 
6.5.4 Leisure activities 
 
Leisure activities have slightly different significance from the other categories of items 
in the sense that a Social Fund loan cannot be used to pay for them.  However, they 
may be first to be forgone when times are hard and income to pay for other things is 
low, perhaps as a result of repaying a Social Fund loan.  People were asked whether 
they wanted to undertake, and whether they could afford, the following activities: 
celebration with presents at special occasions; toys an sports gear for children; 
money for outings, trips or gifts for parties; one week holiday away from home; a 
night out once a month; new friends or relatives for a meal once a month.  Once 
again, these were combined into a single leisure activities deprivation index.    
  
The analysis revealed no significant difference between those repaying a Social 
Fund loan and those not in terms of the Relative Deprivation Score Measure using 
leisure activities.   
 
6.5.5 Overall relative deprivation  
 
The 34 items which make up the four dimensions of expenditure were combined to 
create a single index of deprivation.  Overall, there was no significant difference 
between those repaying a Social Fund loan and those not in terms of change in 
material deprivation.  
 
6.6 How does repaying a loan relate to families’ hardship?  
 
The hardship score can range from 0 (no hardship on any of the factors) through to 
nine (hardship on all of the factors).  These scores were then summarised into three 
categories of hardship: 
• No hardship: families scoring zero on the scale 
• Moderate hardship: families scoring one or two on the scale 
• Severe hardship: families scoring three through nine. 
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Families were considered to be in general hardship if they were experiencing either 
moderate or severe hardship. 
 
Table 6.11 demonstrates how general hardship changed from one year to the next 
for those repaying a Social Fund loan in the first year compared those not repaying a 
loan.  There was a significant difference between those repaying a loan and those 
not repaying a Social Fund loan in relation to overall change in hardship.  Those 
repaying a loan were significantly less likely than those not repaying a loan to 
experience a change in hardship the following year.  Indeed, a significantly higher 
proportion of those in receipt of a Social Fund loan remained in hardship, compared 
with those not in receipt of a loan.  Moreover, of those who did experience change in 
level of hardship, it was more likely to be in the direction of falling into hardship.  
Generally, this indicates that repaying a Social Fund loan, perhaps as a result of the 
decrease in income, was more likely to push families into hardship than to lift them 
out of it.  
 
Table 6.11 Change in hardship between by whether repaying a loan 
       Column percentages 
Change Not repaying a Social 
Fund loan 
Repaying a Social 
Fund loan 
  
 No hardship to severe/moderate 
hardship 16 12 
 Severe/moderate hardship to no 
hardship 13 9 
 No change – still in hardship 54 71 
 No change – still not in hardship 17 8 
 Unweighted base 1084 725 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both years analysed and on IS in both years. 
 
Repaying a Social Fund loan appears to have a different impact on hardship 
depending upon family type.  Tables 6.12 and 6.13 show change in hardship for 
couple families and for lone parent families.  For both family types, repaying a loan 
was significantly less likely to be associated with a change in hardship status 
compared to those not repaying a loan.  However, the direction of this change was 
different for couple parents (although this analysis should be treated with caution, 
due to small numbers) compared to lone parents.  For couple parents, repaying a 
Social Fund loan was more likely to be associated with being lifted from hardship, but 
for lone parent families with falling into hardship.  This is perhaps because the 
decrease in income as a result of repaying the Social Fund loan is enough to plunge 
already vulnerable lone parent families deeper into hardship. 
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Table 6.12 Change in couples hardship between by whether repaying a loan 
      Column percentages 
Change Not repaying a Social 
Fund loan 
Repaying a Social 
Fund loan 
  
 No hardship to severe/moderate 
hardship [19] [8] 
 Severe/moderate hardship to no 
hardship [14] [12] 
 No change – still in hardship 47 76 
 No change – still not in hardship [21] [4] 
 Unweighted base 171 74 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both years analysed and on IS in both years. 
 
Table 6.13 Change in lone parents hardship between by whether repaying a loan 
      Column percentages 
Change Not repaying a Social 
Fund loan 
Repaying a Social 
Fund loan 
  
 No hardship to severe/moderate 
hardship 16 12 
 Severe/moderate hardship to no 
hardship 12 9 
 No change – still in hardship 55 71 
 No change – still not in hardship 17 8 
 Unweighted base 683 996 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both years analysed and on IS in both years. 
 
6.7 Conclusions 
 
On five out of the nine hardship indicators, there was a significant relationship 
between repaying a Social Fund loan and hardship change in the following year.  
These were:  
 
1. Worries about money almost all the time and runs out of money most weeks. 
2. Has no bank account and has two or more debts.  
3. Cannot afford to keep house warm. 
4. Has a relative material deprivation score on clothing items in the highest 7.5 
per cent. 
5. Has a relative material deprivation score on consumer durables in the highest 
7.5 per cent. 
 
For each of these indicators, those repaying a Social Fund loan were significantly 
more likely to experience change in hardship compared to those not repaying a 
Social Fund loan.  However, the direction of this change was not decisively one way 
or the other.  For the hardship indicators (numbers 1-3), the change was positive 
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(moving into less hardship).  But for the deprivation score on clothing items, the 
change was negative (moving into deprivation).  The direction of change for the 
deprivation score on consumer durables was inconclusive.  
 
According to the overall hardship measure - which combine all nine 
hardship/deprivation indicators - those repaying a loan were less likely to experience 
change in hardship compared to those not repaying a Social Fund loan, and if they 
did experience change, it was more likely to be in the direction greater hardship. 
 
What we cannot tell from this analysis is why some people were able to experience 
an increase in hardship, whilst others had a decrease in hardship in the year 
following receipt of a Social Fund loan.  This suggests that other, unmeasured 
characteristics and experiences affect hardship/deprivation in addition to the Social 
Fund loan.  To explore this would require a more in-depth analysis of hardship than is 
possible within the scope of this study. 
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7   CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The budgeting loan scheme is not only the operational heart and soul of the Social 
Fund (Craig, 2001); it is also an important and highly valued component of the 
financial support provided to low-income families in receipt of qualifying benefits 
(Kempson, 2001), particularly Income Support.  Currently, over a third of families on 
Income Support receive a Social Fund (budgeting or crisis) loan each year.  In total, 
two-fifths of families on Income Support at any time are repaying a loan by deduction 
from their benefit.  The net cost of the budgeting loan scheme, once loan recoveries 
are taken into account, is very low: only £3.6 million in 2002/03.  The cost of 
administering the scheme, however, is quite high. 
 
Chapter 3 examined the extent to which recipients of qualifying benefits make use of 
Social Fund loans.  It is clear, both from the administrative statistics on loan awards 
and the secondary analysis of the Family Resources Survey, that families with 
children make much greater use of Social Fund loans than couples and single people 
without dependent children.  People who are sick and disabled but below 
pensionable age are also over-represented among loan recipients.  However, 
pensioners and people of Asian or Asian British ethnic background are considerably 
under-represented users of Social Fund loans.   
 
The heavy reliance of families with children on Social Fund loans means that the 
scheme is very important to the Government’s strategy for tackling child poverty.  
Consequently, whether or not the scheme is helping the families in most need is an 
important question, as is the impact of loan repayment on hardship.  The analysis 
presented in Chapter 4 of the report demonstrated that there are significant 
differences between those who use the Social Fund to borrow money and those who 
do not.  In general, Social Fund customers were more financially disadvantaged than 
other income support recipients.  They were more likely to run out of money most 
weeks, to have debts, and to have trouble repaying debts and managing their 
finances than non-customers.  They were less likely to have current or savings 
accounts and less likely to have savings.  Families that made repeated use of the 
Social Fund during 2000 to 2002 were in some respects more financially 
disadvantaged than those that applied for a loan only once. 
 
Thus, the evidence from this research indicates that the Social Fund is in general 
helping families that are in most need.  This contrasts with the findings of the study 
by Huby and Dix (1992), which found no discernible differences between those who 
used the fund and those who did not.  That research was conducted not long after 
the introduction of the Social Fund (and included grants as well as loans) and well 
before the 1999 changes to the budgeting loan scheme.  Although the present study 
is not directly comparable with Huby and Dix (1992), it nonetheless does seem that, 
in practice, budgeting loans are now more targeted than they were when the scheme 
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was introduced.  That said, some non-customers were financially disadvantaged and 
it remains unclear why they have not applied for a loan while others in broadly similar 
circumstances have done so.  
 
Chapter 5 of the report investigated the events that were associated statistically with 
applications for a Social Fund loan.  It was found that the triggers that were 
statistically associated with loan applications by families with children related to key 
events in children’s lives, such as reaching school age.  This is not surprising in that, 
for families, these events often do generate the need to make one-off purchases 
such as cots and school uniforms.  These events seem to have been more likely to 
trigger applications for loans by lone parents than couples with children and by 
families without savings than those that do have money saved up. In other words, 
couple parents and families with savings on income support are to some extent 
protected from the negative affects of certain events. 
 
The baby component of the Child Tax Credit is an explicit recognition of the extra 
costs that families face in the first year of a baby’s life.  However, the research 
reported here indicates that extra costs do not end after 12 months, but rather that 
there are other child life-stage events that generate the need to make one-off or other 
purchases that are very difficult to afford out of the weekly benefit.  Parents have to 
make relatively costly purchases when their children become toddlers and reach 
school age.  
 
For those who apply and are successful, the budgeting loan scheme enables families 
to purchase the items that they could not otherwise afford to buy out of their benefit 
income.  The alternatives are to go without - that is, to experience material 
deprivation - or to find other ways of getting the item.  The latter, whether it is buying 
out of a catalogue or borrowing the money from commercial lenders, is invariably a 
much more expensive option than the Social Fund and can result in greater financial 
hardship.   
 
However it is borrowed, the money has to be repaid.  Chapter 6 reported on 
exploratory analysis that aimed to identify the impact of Social Fund loans on 
hardship and material deprivation: in short, were those who borrowed money from 
the fund better off or worse off in terms of hardship and material deprivation?  The 
results indicated that, more often than not, there was a significant relationship 
between receipt of a Social Fund loan and change in material deprivation.  However, 
the direction of this change was not decisively one way or another – in some cases it 
had a negative effect and in others a positive effect in terms of hardship and 
deprivation.  But in terms of overall hardship, there is some indication that repaying a 
Social Fund loan makes families worse off. Repaying a loan was not significantly 
associated with a change in overall hardship.  But if change was experienced, 
repaying a loan was more likely to have a negative effect – and push families into 
greater overall hardship.  
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It was not possible to ascertain from this research why hardship and material 
deprivation got worse for some families but better for others in the year following their 
loan.  It may have been due to factors other than receipt of a loan and the repayment 
of it, but that is beyond the scope of this research.  Further quantitative or qualitative 
research would be necessary to provide more definitive answers to this question.  
What is clear, though, is that many families in receipt of Social Fund loans are 
struggling to get by on their benefit, that the Social Fund is a much cheaper way to 
borrow money than other sources of loan finance, and that those who receive 
budgeting loans are generally more financially disadvantaged off than those who do 
not. 
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APPENDIX 1  
 
Table A1  Key Social Fund Research Studies 
Study Objectives Method 
 
Pre 1999 
Becker and 
Silburn (1990) 
 
Twenty-seven SSD/SWDs 
participated in the Social Fund 
monitoring project. Its core 
objectives were: 
 
To monitor the impact of the 
Social Fund and related Social 
Security changes on the 
operation and practices of 
social work. 
 
Especially, it was concerned 
with social work professional 
practice and activity, 
departmental policy and 
operation and the interface 
between these and key parts of 
the Social Security system and 
clients/claimants. 
 
Analysis of policy statements and 
procedural guides Analysis of 
administrative records 
Ad hoc surveys  
Snap shot surveys 
Case studies 
Secondary analysis 
Evaluative research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Huby and Dix 
(1992) 
 
To Investigate the operation of 
the discretionary elements of 
the Social Fund.   
 
To investigate whether help 
was being targeted on 
claimants in greatest need and 
whether there are additional 
types of need which ought to be 
met by the fund.  
 
Analysis of DSS Social Fund statistics  
 
Interviews with DSS staff at all levels, 
people in welfare rights organisations 
and social services in all 39 local office 
areas. 
 
Quantitative survey of 1724 people 
living on low income: 968 Social Fund 
applicants, 408 non applicants and 348 
eligible people on Housing Benefit.  
 
15 Social Fund officers recruited to 
work with the research team for one 
month, including visits by the officers to 
people living on low incomes but who 
had not applied to the Social Fund. To 
assess whether any of the needs of 
those people could potentially be met 
by the Fund. 
 
31 in depth interviews with a sub-
sample of survey respondents who had 
applied to the Social Fund.  
 
 103
 
Dalley and 
Berthoud (1992) 
 
To describe the operation of the 
discretionary social fund review 
procedure, and to evaluate its 
strengths and weaknesses. 
 
To draw conclusion about their 
decision-making process within 
the social fund.  
 
To draw conclusions about 
systems of redress.  
 
140 in depth interviews of a sample of 
review cases representing both a 
geographical spread and a range of 
review types. 136 of these agreed for 
their case to be followed back to the 
local office and discussed in detail with 
the relevant officers. 
 
41 in depth interviews with Social Fund 
officers about the details of the case in 
the sample for which the officer had 
been responsive and their general 
views about the Social Fund and their 
review procedure.   
 
28 in depth interviews with Social Fund 
Inspectors first about the about the 
details of the case in the sample for 
which the officer had been responsive 
and their general views about the Social 
Fund and their review procedure.   
 
Examination of documentation related 
to each case.  
Cohen et al. 
(1996) 
 
To examine how the 
discretionary Social Fund 
works; its capacity to meet 
need and the extent to which 
charitable sources help people 
unsuccessful in their application 
to the Social Fund.  
 
 
Analysis of DSS Social Fund statistics 
 
Policy analysis 
 
Case studies in Great Pilton, Edinburgh 
Post 1999 
Whyley et al. 
(2000) 
 
To explore ways in which 
people use both budgeting loan 
scheme and community credit 
unions and to provide some 
initial information on claimants 
view o f the new budgeting loan 
scheme.  
 
37 in depth interviews with 16 budgeting 
loan applicants and 21 credit union 
members. These explored individual’s 
use of, experience and attitudes of both 
schemes. And their views and 
experience of using other forms of 
credit.  
 
Three focus groups exploring how 
people decide what sources of credit to 
use for specific types of need. Group 1: 
people who had had a budgeting loan 
between April 1999 and October 1999; 
Group 2: community credit union 
members who were receiving qualifying 
benefits; Group 3: people on qualifying 
benefit who had not applied for a 
budgeting loan since April 1999 nor 
were they credit union members.  
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Kempson et al. 
(2002) 
 
To provide an understanding of 
the reasons for take-up and 
non-take up of the discretionary 
Social Fund among pensioners 
receiving Income Support in the 
form of MIG. 
 
To explore ways of addressing 
the barriers to take-up among 
those pensioners who are in 
need. 
 
In depth interviews with 37 older people 
in receipt of MIG, half who had not used 
the discretionary Social Fund and half 
who had received at least one 
budgeting loan or community care 
grant. These were carried out in four 
different localities: two with high level 
for use of the Social Fund by 
pensioners and two with low levels of 
use.  
 
Two focus groups – one with eight non-
applicants and one with nine applicants 
to the Social Fund.  
Howard (2003) 
 
To examine options for 
reforming the Social Fund in 
light of Government activity on 
poverty and changes to the 
deliver of benefit services. 
 
To demonstrate it is possible to 
use Families and Children 
Study (FACS) to construct a 
‘lumpy’ index; to help identify 
the needs covered by Social 
Fund policy.  
 
Policy analysis 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of the 1999/2000 Families and 
Children Study (FACS).  
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
Table A1 Logistic regressions of the odds of being a repeat applicant for a Social 
Fund loan 
 Significance (Exp)B 
Lone parent 0.014 1.768 
Hardly ever had money left over 0.025 1.582 
No savings and 2 or more debts 0.001 2.000 
Base: Respondents who had made an application for a Social Fund loan in 2000, 2001 or 
2002. 
 
 
Table A2 Logistic regressions of the odds of making a Social Fund loan application  
 Significance (Exp)B 
Moving house 0.000 1.697 
A child reaching age 3 0.008 1.445 
A child starting school 0.028 1.377 
Decrease in the number of dependent 
children 
0.002 0.626 
Base: Respondents interviewed in both trigger and application year and on IS in application 
year. 
 
 
Table A3 Logistic regressions of the odds of making a Social Fund loan application 
for lone parents  
 Significance (Exp)B 
Moving house 0.000 1.638 
Decrease in the number of dependent 
children 
0.011 0.632 
Base: Lone parent respondents in application year interviewed in both trigger and application 
year and on IS in application year. 
 
 
Table A4   Logistic regressions of the odds of making a Social Fund loan application 
for couple parents (2000-2002 triggers) 
 Significance (Exp)B 
A child reaching age 3 0.018 2.133 
Base: Couple parent respondents in application year interviewed in both trigger and 
application year and on IS in application. 
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Table A5 Logistic regressions of the odds of making a Social Fund loan application 
by no savings in any year (2000-2002 triggers) 
 Significance (Exp)B 
Moving house 0.000 1.606 
A child starting school 0.017 1.500 
A child reaching age 3 0.014 1.462 
Increase dependent children 0.030 0.680 
Decrease dependent children 0.002 0.592 
Base: Respondents with no savings in application year and interviewed in trigger year and 
application year and on IS in application year. 
 
 
Table A6   Logistic regressions of the odds of making a Social Fund loan application 
by savings in any year (2000-2002 triggers) 
 Significance (Exp)B 
Moving house 0.016 1.952 
Base: Respondents with savings in application year and interviewed in trigger year and 
application year and on IS in application year. 
  
